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Students shot dead on Black Friday 
Calls for ABRI to get out of politics and for Suharto to be put on trial reverberated on the streets of 
Jakarta for a whole week as tens of thousands of students and hundreds of thousands of citizens 
protested against the Supreme Consultative Assembly (MPR) special session. On Black Friday, 13 
November, eight students were slain as troops opened fire on peaceful demonstrators, almost six 
months to the day after student demonstrators forced the dictator, Suharto, to step down. 
The mass campaign against the MPR's special session 
began on 28 October, when tens of thousands of students 
demonstrated peacefully in Jakarta, protesting against the 
meeting scheduled for 10-13 November and denouncing 
the dwifungsi which gives ABRI, the armed forces unre-
stricted powers in all the affairs of state. 
The demonstrations that began on 10 November grew 
in size as the week progressed. The students raised three 
main demands: 
• reject the Special Session of the Supreme Consulta-
tive Assembly, the MPR, 
• abolish the army's dwifungsi (the dual function) 
which allows ABRI to play a dominant role in po-
litical affairs, and 
• put Suharto on trial for corruption and human rights 
violations. 
By Thursday, hundreds of thousands were out on the 
streets, clamouring to get near to the MPR building where 
the one thousand members were cloistered behind a huge 
wall of troops. 
The tens of thousands of students came from universi-
ties in Jakarta and West Java. The groups included Forkot, 
or City Forum, FKSMJ or Communications Forum of 
Greater Jakarta Student Senates, HM/ or Muslim Students 
Association, Kobar or Workers' Action Reform Commit-
tee, Komrad or Committee of Students and People for De-
mocracy, Famred or Students Action Front for Reform and 
Democracy, Forbes or Collective Forum, KPM or Youth 
Committee to Support Megawati, the Students' Family of 
the Bandung Institute of Technology, and many others. 
With students trying to approach the MPR building 
from different directions, some succeeded in breaching the 
blockade and were set upon by troops. Pitch battles ensued 
between soldiers wielding rifles butts, truncheons and 
sticks and unarmed students who resorted to throwing 
stones. Throughout the week, armoured vehicles and water 
cannon supplied to the Indonesian armed forces by British 
companies, were used to quell the protesters. 
In addition to the troops, the armed forces had hired 
gangs of men to join a vigilante brigade called PAM 
Swakarsa armed with sharpened bamboo sticks (bambu 
runcing), to set upon the demonstrators. In many incidents, 
these gangs were the first to start throwing missiles from 
behind the lines of troops. These gangs played such a dis-
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ruptive role that the Jakarta police chief tried to have them 
disarmed and removed from the streets. In several parts of 
the city. inhabitants repulsed vigilantes who tried to enter 
their kampungs. In the clashes that ensued, several of the 
vigilantes \Vere killed. 
The first student casualties fell on 12 November when a 
20-year old man named Lukman Firdaus was fatally in-
jured by gunfire and scores of people were wounded. 
Thousands of students intent on encircling the MPR 
building confronted the troops and the vigilantes in four 
different parts of the city. After being assailed with trun-
cheons and bambu runcing, the demonstrators were at-
tacked with water cannon, teargas and gunfire. 
The Semanggi Tragedy 
On the next day, which was to become known as Black 
Friday, even larger crowds filled the streets. The worst 
clashes occurred around the Semanggi cloverleaf bridge 
near Atma Jaya University, which is about a kilometre 
from the MPR building. By early afternoon, according to 
Waspada [14 November], tens of thousands of students 
joined by workers and other Jakarta citizens, had gathered 
near the cloverleaf. Their intention was to march to the 
MPR building but they were prevented from doing so by 
large numbers of troops and vigilantes, many on armoured 
vehicles below. They were attacked with water cannon and 
tear gas, and when this failed to disperse the crowds, shots 
were fired. The Waspada account describes troops on ar-
moured vehicles careering from place to place in an at-
tempt to disperse the demonstrators, and prevent them from 
approaching the MPR. Most of the troops were from 
KOSTRAD, the army's strategic command, and BRIMOB, 
the police anti-riot corps. 
According to other reports, the sound of gunfire rang 
out for seven hours and by the end of the day, it was clear 
that at least seven students had been killed in the vicinity of 
Semanggi and hundreds injured, many from gunfire. 
Richard Lloyd Parry of The Independent who was in 
the thick of it wrote: 
' ... a few thousand students began to gather in front of 
Atma Jaya university, to be joined by several thousand ... 
young men from poor neighbourhoods nearby. They were 
unarmed, they were 20 minutes' walk from the parliament 
and the worst offence being committed was obstructing the 
traffic. The soldiers I saw ... were energetic combat troops. 
They began firing at 3. 40pm as armoured cars and water 
cannon advanced down the road. The legitimate job of 
clearing the road was achieved in five minutes. But the 
barrage of shooting continued unabated for a full I 5 min-
utes. At least four people were fatally wounded during that 
first round of firing ... ' [The Independent, 19 November] 
Police chief Rusmanhadi later denied that the troops 
had been equipped with live ammunition. However, doc-
tors who carried out autopsies on the dead students told the 
press that they had found metal fragments from 'high-
velocity type' bullets in the bodies of the seven students. 
The head of the forensic department of the Cipto Mangun-
kusumo Hospital, Dr Mu' nim lndris said the fragments 
had been handed over to the military. [AP, 20 November] 
Several injured students have described how they were 
shot by soldiers after they had fallen to the ground. Ferkin 
Susanto, a history student, said he fell to the ground in the 
lobby of a bank where he had fled to take cover when .a 
soldier aimed his gun and fired a rubber bullet into h.1s 
chest. ·I tried to get up but the soldiers kicked me agam 
and I knew I had to run, even if I couldn't breathe.' 
[Sydney Morning Herald, 21 November] 
Hired to inform on the students 
Wiwid Prawito, 21 , who is a student at Trisakti Univer-
1 
sity, Jakarta, was recruited as an informer for the intelli-
gence operation to protect the MPR against the students. 
Full of remorse for having betrayed his fellow students, he 
decided to tell the National Human Rights Commission of 
his experiences and seek its protection for himself and his 
family. 
He was hired back in August by a soldier, a second-
class private from a military police unit attached to the 
presidential guard, whom he knew only by the initials BL. 
They had met at a bus stop. The soldier made several visits 
to the family home to win their confidence. 
Then one day, BL took Wiwik to a place in Tanah-
abang, Jakarta, where he was introduced to an ABRI offi-
cer and asked to sign a contract agreeing to help safeguard 
the MPR. When he refused, he was warned that they knew 
all about his parents and sister who might suffer the conse-
quences. 
He was assigned to recruit civilian guards and monitor· 
universities for information about the student movement. 
One of his assignments was to transport people from a 
number of locations to Cijantung, (headquarters of Kopas~ 
sus, the army's elite corps). He made trips to Pandeglang, 
Banten, Solo, Yogyakarta, Semarang and Surabaya, by 
army truck. At each place, he handed over an envelope to a 
local government official who then supplied several dozen 
men. In all, he transported about 160 men to Cijantung. 
He was instructed to mingle with students at Atma Jaya 
University during the MPR session. On 13 November, he 
received a message from BL through his pager warning 
him to move out as there would be a 'shooting spree' from 
I to 4 pm. 
'I was promised Rp 10,000 for each piece of informa-
tion I supplied but I haven't received anything.' he told the 
Commission members: 
Munir, the director of Kontras, the Commission for 
· Missing Persons and Victims of Violence, who accompa-
nied Wiwid, said: 'This is part of the political terror, taking 
advantage of people's economic plight to recruit them for 
military operations.' [Kompas and Jakarta Post, 22 No-
vember] 
Many of those recruited were unemployed men from 
across Java. Several interviewed by Jakarta Post while the 
MPR session was still in progress said they were paid Rp 
I 0,000 ($1.25) a day plus food,. which, in these difficult 
times, 'was better than sitting at home doing nothing'. 
[Jakarta Post, 12 November] 
Seventeen dead, 456 injured 
In a statement issued on 14 November, Father I. San-
dyawan Sumardi SJ, the secretary of Tim Relawan Ke-
manusiaan [Volunteers' Team for Humanity], said that the 
bloody events had shown 'how difficult it is for the major-
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ity of people in this country to articulate their choices, even 
though this is supposed to be the Era of Reformasi'. He 
said it was the Tim Relawan 's policy to be present at such 
events to provide medical assistance to those in need. A 
Team member named Bernardinus Realino Norma Ir-
mawan, 'Wawan', an Atma Jaya student, was on duty at 
the time of the Semanggi Tragedy. While attending to a 
wounded person who was waiting for an ambulance, he 
was shot in the chest. He was rushed to hospital but died at 
6pm on 13 November. 'The bullet which killed him was a 
live bullet, not a rubber bullet,' the priest said. 
According to the Tim Relawan 's on-the-spot investiga-
tions, seventeen people were killed, of whom six were uni-
versity students and two high-school pupils . Two police 
officers were among the dead as well as four members of 
the PAM Swakarsa brigade and one member of another 
vigilante unit. Two local inhabitants who also died had not 
yet been identified. 
Altogether 456 people were injured, in most cases by 
gunshot wounds or from being struck with hard, sharp im 
POLITICS 
The MPR which was convened to adopt decrees re-
garding forthcoming elections was the very same body 
which rubber-stamped Suharto's appointment for a seventh 
term in March this year, two months before his overthrow 
in May, and adopted a decree granting him yet more spe-
cial powers. Well over half the members are Suharto ap-
pointees, with GOLKAR controlling the lion's share. The 
remaining seats are held by the two parties that were al-
lowed to exist under Suharto's New Order, plus 75 ABRI 
appointees. Several dozen MPR members from GOLKAR 
were replaced before the special session to bolster the po-
sition of the party's new chairman, Akbar Tandjung, who 
as Secretary of State is Habibie's right-hand man. These 
manoeuvres meant that forces within the Habibie govern-
ment were bent on ensuring decisions that would promote 
their own chances of clinging on to power in next year's 
general elections and the presidential election six months 
later. 
Nothing could be farther removed 
from the spirit of reformasi which is 
supposed to inspire Indonesia's transition 
from dictatorship to democracy. In the 
past six months, scores of new political 
parties have been born, representing a 
wide range of political and social inter-
ests. The removal of Suharto has given 
birth to a totally new political situation. 
These are the forces whose rights have to 
be safeguarded in new laws that will de-
termine the way in which the forthcom-
ing elections are conducted. No genuine 
democrat could be expected to entrust 
this to a New Order relic like the MPR. 
A student hit by gunfire 
These new laws will be enacted by 
the DPR, the Parliament, whose 500 
members also sit in the MPR. This DPR 
is the result of the fraudulent elections 
held in 1997; 75 seats are occupied by 
ABRI appointees. In the wake of the 
campaign against the MPR special ses-
sion, meetings of the DPR are becoming 
plements. They include students, journalists, members of 
the security forces and ordinary people of all ages. Among 
the wounded is a six-year old child who was hit by a stray 
bullet. 
The MPR, a New Order relic 
The decision by the Habibie government to convene a 
Special Session of the Supreme Consultative Assembly, 
the MPR, had been widely condemned by the pro-
democracy forces for months. President Habibie, whose 
mainstay in office is the Indonesian Armed Forces, ABRI, 
under commander-in-chief General Wiranto, knew very 
well that the Special Session would trigger mass opposition 
yet pressed ahead regardless. When Wiranto announced 
that 30,000 troops would be deployed in the capital to 
'secure' the meeting and tens of thousands of civilian 
vigilantes would be recruited as part of a massive operation 
to prevent anyone from disrupting the event, it was clear 
that the ABRI chief was determined to protect the MPR at 
all costs. 
the target of new protests. 
Abolish the dwif ungsi! 
But the main obstacle to democracy in Indonesia is 
ABRI's dwifangsi or dual function. Since the downfall of 
Suharto, a Pandora's Box of atrocities by members of the 
armed forces has been opened up. Revelations of killings, 
disappearances and rapes in Aceh have filled the columns 
of national and local n~wspapers. Massive human rights 
abuses in West Papua have been exposed and diverse 
groups have demanded inquiries into the numerous massa-
cres perpetrated by troops in Tanjung Priok (1984), Lam-
pung (1989), East Tim or (1991 ), all of which are laid at the 
door of ABRI. Investigations into the mass rape of Chinese 
women during the riots in Jakarta on 13-14 May this year · 
when at least 1,200 people died have highlighted the role 
of members of the security forces (see separate item). 
The reputation of the Indonesian armed forces, which 
claims to base its special role on being a 'people's army' 
has never been so low. Commander-in-chief Wiranto, who 
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was seen by many Western governments as a moderate and 
reasonable officer. has gone out of his way to project a 
more friendly image. He has apologised for the atrocities in 
Aceh. announced the withdrawal of special forces from the 
region as well as from West Papua and East Timor, and set 
up an Honour Council within ABRI which led to the ex-
pulsion of Lieutenant-General Prabowo and two other 
senior officers of the elite corps. Kopassus for their in-
volvement in the abduction of pro-democracy activists in 
the months preceding Suharto's downfall. 
In a further attempt to salvage the dwifungsi, he an-
nounced just before the MPR session began that the sos-pol 
directorate within the armed forces was being disbanded. 
This is the sector which appoints serving and retired offi-
cers to non-military posts, the so-called karyawan ap-
pointments through which ABRI permeates the national, 
regional and local administrations. Lt-General Bambang 
Susilo Yudhoyono, who was sos-pol chief of staff if! 
ABRI, was shifted to a newly created post as ABRI chief-
of-staff for territorial affairs. Most people see this as noth-
ing more than a tactical move to make ABRI more accept-
able to civil society. 
The true face of ABRI 
However, the massive deployment of troops during the 
MPR session showed that ABRI's true colours have not 
changed. With bullets flying in all directions and the dead 
and wounded being rushed to hospital with bullet wounds, 
stab wounds or stunned by water cannon and tear gas, Wi-
ranto' s mask fell to the ground. 
As the tragedy of Black Friday unfolded, with continu-
ous coverage on television while other programmes were 
taken off the air for most of the day, the students' demand 
for an end to the dwifungsi found resonance across the po-
1 itical spectrum with demands for the 'amiable' Wiranto to 
be sacked and tried. 
The hapless Habibie, who according to his chief 
spokesperson, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, had little idea of what 
was going on [The Independent, 17 November], could only 
respond to the tragedy by announcing, with Wiranto at his 
side that he had ordered the armed forces to 'take stern mea~ures' against 'subversives' who were allegedly seek-
ing to overthrow the government. 
Thus far, the people who have been netted are a group 
of retired armed forces officers, members of a ginger group 
called Barisan Nasional or National Front who signed a 
statement shortly before the MPR session, calling for a 
presidium to be set up in place of the present government. 
The leading light is Kemal Idris, a former elite force gen-
eral, and Ali Sadikin, a retired Marines officer; they were 
taken in for questioning and are likely to be charged for 
rebellion for 'inciting the students to disrupt the MPR ses-
sion. Sri-Bintang Pamungkas, a former MP who has had 
repeated brushes with the law in the past few years and 
who heads PUDI, one of the earliest of the new political 
parties to be set up, has also been questioned. Another is 
Permadi, a well-known soothsayer who was also held and 
charged while Suharto was still in power. 
According to official sources, they will face charges for 
rebellion and conspiring to overthrow the government 
which carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. 
Wiranto's strategy seems to be to blame the events 
during the MPR session on a sinister conspi.racy between 
disloyal retired officers and students as th~tr pup~et~,. to 
topple the 'constitutional ' government. Besides tnv1al~s~ng 
the student movement which has played such a dec1s1ve 
role in pushing Indonesia towards democracy, t~is ploy is 
intended to conceal the illegitimacy of the appointment ~f 
Suharto's protege Habibie as president, brokered by Wt-
ranto when Suharto resigned. While Habibie still ~arbou~s 
dreams of winning a second term as president, Wtrant? !s 
using his commanding political role in the weak Hab1b1e 
government to preserve what he can of the dwifungsi. 
More student demonstrations follow 
While these events were taking place in Jakarta, stu-
dents were out on the streets protesting in many parts of the 
country. They included an action to commandeer a plane in 
Medan, North Sumatra, to go to Jakarta and the occupation 
of Hasanuddin Airport in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi. 
Students also occupied the regional parliament building 
and used the assembly hall to air their demands. There was 
a day of demonstrations by students in Ambon, Maluku 
during which at least two dozen students were injured in 
clashes with the security forces. 
In Yogyakarta, hundreds of students staged a rally to 
support the same demands as their colleagues in Jakarta. In 
Malang, East Java, students were prevented from occupy-
ing the local radio station to broadcast their demands. In 
Surabaya, also in East Java, dozens of students scaled the 
walls of the Mandarin Majapahit Hotel and waved flags 
and banners from the roof. Other actions took place in 
Bandung, West Java and Salatiga, Central Java. 
After the events during the MPR session, more rallies 
were held. On 19 November, thousands of students gath-
ered in Menteng, Jakarta, hoping to surround the residence 
of former dictator, Suharto, to highlight their demand that 
he be tried in a court of law for accumulating wealth un-
lawfully while head of state. They were prevented from 
reaching their objective by hundreds of troops and eventu-
ally dispersed peacefully. A few days later, they marched 
to the Attorney General's Office with their demands for 
Suharto to be put on trial. 
Attempts to derail the movement 
Following Black Friday, there was a day of rioting and 
looting in some commercial centres where ethnic Chinese 
businesses are located. This was quite unconnected with 
the student actions and there were fears that this would be a 
repeat of the riots in May following the killing of four Tri-
sakti University students, when 1,200 people died and 
scores of Chinese women were raped. However, the rioting 
ended after a few hours. 
Many observers have commented on the orderliness and 
discipline of the student demonstrators who refrained 
throughout from inflicting damage on property and vehi-
cl~. • 
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TAPOL 25 years, and still going strong 
TAPOL's 25th anniversary comes just months after the downfall of the Indonesian dictator, Su-
harto. A glance back at what we have tried to do provides an insight into the depth and persistence of 
gross human rights violations suffered by people living under Indonesian rule. It will help identify 
the tasks which lie ahead as Indonesia struggles to create a democratic country 
It was in June 1973 that, for the first time, a small group 
of people demonstrated outside the Indonesian embassy in 
London's Grosvenor Square, to protest against the contin-
ued detention without trial of tens of thousands of Indone-
sian political prisoners held since Suharto seized power in 
1965. In the late sixties, several MPs and left-wing activ-
ists, among them the late Arthur Clegg and Stan Newens 
MP (now a member of the European Parliament), had been 
to the embassy, spoken out in Parliament and written to the 
press condemning the massacres instigated by Suharto, 
which left up to a million people dead, but no one was lis-
tening. Eight years after Suharto came to power, a cam-
paign to expose the brutalities of Indonesia's Orde Baru 
(New Order) rulers was clearly long overdue. 
The occasion of our first demonstration was the meet-
ing of the international aid consortium, the IGGI. We urged 
Indonesia's western financiers to stop propping up a re-
gime whose hands were steeped in blood. They have been 
at it ever since, and so have we. 
The action was supported by people from various po-
1 itical parties, from the trade unions, churches and the film 
world; it prompted a group of MPs to table a motion in the 
Commons. Encouraged by this and armed with a striking 
emblem designed by an Indonesian living in London, 
Taunus Kemasang, we decided to turn ourselves into a 
permanent campaigning body, then called the British Cam-
paign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners. 
The choice of 'tapol', a contraction of tahanan politik or 
'political prisoner', as our name was intended to popularise 
a new word that entered the Indonesian vocabulary after 
1965. 
Under attack 
Despite our modest beginnings and a scruffy-looking 
newsletter, it was not long before the Jakarta regime began 
to vilify us. In June 1974, the Indonesian Defence Depart-
ment refuted TAPOL's condemnation of the use of tapols 
as forced labour, working for private companies and public 
works projects; they admitted that such practices had oc-
curred but they had now been ended. In August 1974, the 
Department again held a press conference, this time to de-
nounce T APOL and one of its founders, Carmel Budiardjo, 
herself a recently released tapol, for 'creating misunder-
standings' about the treatment of tapols and for seeking to 
discredit the Indonesian government. A month later they 
were at it again, to announce that the word tapol was now 
banned because Indonesia 'does not hold any political 
prisoners', only persons who have broken the law (even 
though there was not enough evidence to prove it!). 
At the time, it was estimated that there were still 70,000 
to l 00,000 political prisoners in prisons, detention centres 
and labour camps across the length and breadth of the 
country. The vast majority were classified as 'B' category, 
who would not be brought to trial for lack of evidence. but 
who could not be released because they were 'known to 
have been directly or indirectly involved' in the events of 
30 September 1965. The armed forces were in charge, with 
special powers vested in KOP KAMTIB, the Operational 
Command for the Restoration of Security and Order 
headed by Suharto. There was no serious attempt by KOP-
KAMTIB or anyone else in the regime to quantify the num-
ber of prisoners. The facts were shrouded in cynicism and 
mystery. Attorney General Major-General Sugih Arto air-
ily dismissed journalists' queries: 'The figure fluctuates 
like the rate of the yen against the dollar.' 
Pressure begins to bear fruit 
By late 1975 however, the pressure on Jakarta was be-
ginning to bear fruit. For the first time, a release plan was 
announced. It was a slippery beast, changing shape and 
substance from day to day. However, after 'ten long years' 
- to borrow the title of a drama written and produced by 
Roger Hibbitt and others in the T APOL collective and 
shown at a London theatre for three nights running to 
packed houses - the military now realised that Indonesia 
desperately ~eeded ~nancial support which could be jeop-
ardised by its notonety as the world's worst violator of 
human rights and identified as such by Amnesty Interna-
tional. 
While T APOL can claim part of the credit, there were 
many factors forcing the U-turn. The dictatorship was fac-
ing its first serious financial crisis when the state oil com-
pany, Pertamina, needed a bail-out for indebtedness re-
sulting from corrupt deals amounting to $10 billion (in the 
middle of an oil boom!). Indonesia faced annual condem-
nation at the International Labour Organisation for its con~ 
travention of ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labour, in 
particular because of the horrific revelations about condi-
tions at the forced-labour camp on Buru Island where tens 
of thousands of 'B' category tapols were now living and 
dying. The IGGI's bankrolling had by now reached $2 400 
million a year and some member states, notably Holland 
which chaired the consortium, were under pressure from 
domestic public opinion. In London, TAPOL held a rally at 
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St Martin's-in-the-Fields. Trafalgar Square to prot,est 
against the ·Queen's visit to Indonesia in March 1974. 
After a slow start and much foot-dragging, the release 
of ·s· category prisoners was more or less completed by 
the end of 1979, though the conditions of release rendered 
the ex-tapols second-class citizens, with few civil rights to 
speak of, hostage to a regime which needed to keep alive 
the spectre of the ·communist menace'. 
Broadening the campaign 
But TAPOL had moved \Vith the times. Already in 
1974. it started campaigning on behalf of students arrested 
for demonstrating against the visiting Japanese Prime 
Minister. In June 1975. it turned its attention to massacres 
in West Papua, and in October that year. \varned in its 
Bulletin of the impending aggression against East Timor 
and the bloodshed and terror this would entail. 
While continuing to report the trials of dozens of ·A· 
category prisoners charged in connection with the 1965 · 
events or for trying to re-establish the unlawfully banned 
communist party, there was also extensive coverage in our 
Bulletin of the student trials. 
The campaign also turned its attention to atrocities in 
West Papua. The first report we published came from a 
Dutch newspaper account of massacres in Biak that had 
occurred in June 1970. Following the invasion of East 
Timor, T APOL provided regular reports of news that man-
aged to breach the almost total information blackout. 
A constant theme was condemnation of British arms 
sales to Indonesia. In April 1978, British Aerospace an-
nounced its first contract to supply Indonesia with eight 
Hawk ground-attack aircraft. T APOL launched a major 
campaign, writing to all Labour Party branches throughout 
the country - the contract had been licensed by the Labour 
Government then in power - and initiated questions and 
motions in both houses of Parliament. Since then, we have 
campaigned ceaselessly against British arms sales to Indo-
nesia, building alliances with other UK organisations such 
as Campaign Against Arms Trade and the World Devel-
opment Movement. In the past few years, with the help of 
documentation from activists in Indonesia, we have be the 
source for several major TV documentaries exposing Brit-
ain's arming of the Indonesian armed forces. 
At the beginning of 1980 we decided to change the 
name of our campaign to the British Campaign for the 
Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indo-
nesia, to reflect the broader remit we had already assumed 
for several years. 
TAPOL under attack from the FEER 
While T APOL saw itself as a small ginger-group 
working with limited resources and for the first five years 
with no full-time staff, the Indonesian regime clearly saw 
us as a dangerous menace. As the release programme gath-
ered pace, there was pressure on us to abandon our cam-
paign, the assertion being that since we had been set up to 
campaign for the release of the 1965 prisoners, there was 
no justification for us to continue. The pressure came from 
an unexpected quarter, the Hong Kong-based Far Eastern 
Economic Review, read widely throughout the region in 
business, academic and government circles. 
During 1979, the weekly had published several letters 
from TAPOL but never without an editorial rejoinder or 
response from Yusuf Wanandi, Deputy-Director of Ja-
karta's Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the 
regime's think-tank. Then in April 1980, the editor, Derek 
Davies, wrote to all the sponsors whose names appeared on 
our letter-head, suggesting that, now that the mass release 
of prisoners had taken place, it was time 'for the Society to 
wind itself up' and asking whether they were willing to 'go 
on sponsoring the political activities of Mrs Budiardjo'. 
This shameless attempt by an influential mainstream 
publication to shut us down had the finger-prints or Jakarta 
all over it. When. in response to defamatory articles rub-
lished by the journal, two responses were sent, one a per-
sonal letter on plain paper from Carmel answering slurs on 
her and her husband and the other from TAPOL and signed 
by all the members of the collective, which dealt at length 
with the journal's charges against the organisation, Car-
mel's letter was published as if it had been written on our 
headed notepaper and T APOL - whose letter was not pub-
lished - was accused by the editor of failing to respond to 
the charges made! Since the editor reigns supreme in any 
publication. we were left with no way to expose this blatant 
deception. Many supporters wrote letters in our defence 
which were not published. 
We could hardly have needed further evidence that our 
work 11 ·as upsetting the regime, which gave us every en-
couragement to continue. 
In November 1979, Suharto made a state visit to Lon-
don. TAPOL mounted several protests, the largest being 
outside the Guildhall where the Indonesian dictator ad-
dressed a state banquet. A T APOL poster produced for the 
occasion and pasted in many places throughout the capital 
showed Suharto, surrounded by skulls, wielding a knife. 
The text read: 
The Butcher of Jakarta: 
Suharto's Slaughterhouse, 
Indonesia: One million dead, 600, 000 arrested. 
East Tim or, I 00, 000 dead 
West Papua/New Guinea, 90,000 dead 
No one in Indonesia was using such strong language in 
those days but today it is on many people's lips. 
The 1980s nadir 
Once the regime had extricated itself from the Pertam-
ina crisis, Suharto set about consolidating his grip on Indo-
nesian society. The students had been rendered voiceless 
with the banning of student councils and the 'normalisation 
of campus life' in 1978. In 1983 and 1984, army and police 
death-squads killed at least 5,000 'criminal suspects' and 
left most of the bodies lying in the streets. Although this 
became known at the time as petrus or 'mysterious kill-
ings', Suharto acknowledged some years later in his auto-
biography that he had personally given the order for the 
campaign as a 'shock therapy' . Our attempts to persuade 
the British government to condemn Indonesia's head of 
state for having ordered this bloodthirsty campaign were 
fobbed off with casuistic arguments about reading his 
words too literally. 
By this time, Britain was so steeped in the business of 
selling arms to Indonesia that the Thatcher Government 
was not about to say anything that might upset the dictator. 
At a state banquet during a visit to Indonesia in April t 985, 
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Margaret Thatcher enthused about her host, the dictator, 
w_hose troops had by then slaughtered 200,000 East 
T1morese:: 'Our cultures are different but when it comes to 
defending independence and freedom, we are at one with 
you,' she said. 
In 1985, the five political laws on political parties, the 
elections and social organisations were enacted, casting the 
New Order political system into a mould that was intended 
to keep Suharto in power for ever. The state dogma, Pan-
casila, was now enforced as the 'sole principle' for all or-
ganisations. 
The most vociferous opposition to these laws came 
from Muslims who used the mosques to snipe at the policy. 
As a way of teaching them a lesson, an incident was pro-
voked at a mosque in Jakarta's harbour district, Tanjung 
Priok, in September 1984 resulting in a mass demonstra-
tion calling for the release of four mosque officials who 
were being held by the police. Army units opened fire 
killing hundreds of people. Despite calls from the dissident 
group, Petisi 50, for an inquiry, the massacre was quickly 
swept under the carpet at home and by the international 
community. 
There were scores of trials of Muslims during the fol-
lowing two years, many of whose victims are still in gaol 
today . Given the scale of these human rights violations, 
T APOL undertook a major investigation of its own which 
was published by TAPOL in 1986 in a book titled: Indone-
sia: Muslims on Trial. Two years later, the book was 
banned from circulation in Indonesia by the Attorney Gen-
eral's office, by which time however, it had been translated 
into Indonesian and given much wider circulation. We re-
cently decided to re-issue the Indonesian version, now that 
many human rights groups and Muslim groups in Indone-
sia are calling for a thorough investigation of the Tanjung 
Priok massacre and the release of all the Muslim political 
prisoners. 
Executions resumed 
Along with the many other issues it was dealing with, 
TA POL continued to focus on the scores of tapols held for 
alleged involvement in the 1965 events. These were people 
who had been tried in kangaroo trials bent on reinforcing 
the Suharto version that those events were masterminded 
by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The January 
1980 issue of TAPOL Bulletin was devoted to an analysis 
of the trials and the political background, the events of 
1965 which had brought Suharto to power. 
Analysing the 1965 affair has been a common theme in 
TAPOL Bulletins throughout the 25 years of our existence. 
In 1995, we published Tragedi Memusia dan Kemanusiaan 
(A Human Tragedy) by M.R. Siregar, a PKI functionary 
for many years in North Sumatra, on the 1965 events and 
the political events leading up to it. 
Dozens of convicted tapols had . been sentenced to 
death, but there had been no executions since around I 970, 
leading some to think that the regime had relented and 
would 'forgive and forget'. The Dutch Government had 
even been given an assurance that there would be no more 
executions, although human rights lawyer Buyung Nasu-
tion told T APOL that as Jong as the sentences had not been 
commuted, such assurances were meaningless. In May 
1985 he was proved correct when the trade union leader 
Munir was executed after being in prison for nearly 20 
years. More executions followed during the remainder of 
the 1980s, despite worldwide condemnation, including a 
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resolution adopted by the European Parliament, the first of 
many adopted by that body. 
At the end of 1987, we decided to change our name 
once again to The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
Although much of our energies were, and still are, spent 
campaigning in the UK, our contacts , the reach of our in-
formation and many of our campaigns had by then become 
much more worldwide . 
East Timor 
From the start, East Timor' s struggle for independence 
attracted support from pro-independence solidarity groups 
in many countries. But after what appeared at the time to 
be the virtual elimination of armed resistance in 1979, in-
ternational solidarity waned and many groups disbanded. 
TAPOL continued to pursue the issue, and filled the pages 
of many issues of the Bulletin with information on the hu-
man rights situation in East Timar. It is no exaggeration to 
say that in those bleak years, T APOL, along with dedicated 
activists in Australia, shouldered the burden of keeping the 
issue alive as far as international solidarity was concerned. 
In 1979, we published An Act of Genocide: Indonesia's 
Invasion of East Timar by Amie Kohen and John Taylor. 
A staff member went to Australia in 1982 to testify before 
Senate hearings on East Timor. We regularly testified at 
the UN Decolonisation Committee in New York and pub-
lished a number of supplements to TAPOL Bulletin on hu-
man rights and the military operations in East Timar. It 
was then that we established our reputation for broadening 
our coverage on East Timor by analysing Indonesian mili-
tary strategy in the illegally occupied territory. 
In 1988, we supported the efforts of one of our most 
committed supporters, Eric Avebury, member of the House 
of Lords, to set up Parliamentarians for East Timar. The 
following year a Labour MP, Ann Clwyd, visited East 
Timar and became one of the most fervent advocates of the 
rights of the people of East Timor. 
The Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991 and the 
dramatic footage taken by British cameraman Max Stahl 
thrust East Timor onto TV screens around the world, 
making it for the first time a major issue which wester~ 
powers could no longer afford to ignore. For months, we 
found ourselves in a swirl of activity, receiving, translating, 
analysing information on a scale that stretched our re-
sources to the limits. We helped organise a very successful 
hearing in Parliament at which several foreign witnesses of 
the massacre testified. The massacre inspired groups in 
m~ny countrie~ to campaign for East Timar, joining ranks 
with groups m Canada, Japan and Australia that had 
emerged a few years earlier. The international solidarity 
movement for East Timar was now a living force. 
During the Falklands (Malvinas) War in 1982 and the 
Gulf War in 1991, TAPOL argued repeatedly with the 
British Government about the hypocrisy of its response to 
these crises as compared to its muted concern about Indo-
nesia's far graver act of aggression against East Timar, as 
compared with Argentina or Iraq. 
West Papua and Aceh 
Throughout .its many_ years of campaigning, the massive 
abuses in these territories have always been uppermost in 
TAPOL's mind. To the regime these were ' zones of trou-
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trouble' where ·security disrupter gangs' (GPK) operated. 
To us, they \\ere regions \vi th deep-rooted grievances 
against Indonesian rule and massive human rights viola-
tions . Gi\en their different histories, their struggles against 
Indonesian rule have enjoyed very different levels of inter-
national solidarity . 
In 1984, a flare-up of discontent in Jayapura led to 
thousands of West Papuans fleeing across the border to 
Papua New Guinea where many of them still live as refu-
gees. The arrest and murder in custody of Arnold Ap. an-
thropologist and promoter of West Papuan culture, also 
dre\\ attenti<?n to the simmering discontent in West Papua. 
TAPOL became a voice for the West Papuan refugees in 
PNG and lobbied hard for them with the UN High Com-
mission for Refugees. A book published by TAPOL in 
May 1983, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People was 
so popular that it went into three editions. For a decade or 
more, information from West Papua was hard to find until 
the mid 1990s when resistance to the US-UK copper and 
gold mine, Freeport re-emerged and with it, massive abuses 
that were documented and disseminated in Indonesia and 
abroad by the Catholic Church and local NGOs. 
When members of a scientific exhibition were kid-
napped by the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) in 
Mapnduma, east of the Freeport mine, in 1996, TAPOL did 
what it could to persuade the OPM to release the hostages, 
whilst using the event to increase public awareness about 
the injustices of West Papua's annexation by Indonesia. 
Our contact with activists in Jayapura has grown by leaps 
and bounds since then. With the resurgence of demands for 
independence for West Papua since the downfall of Su-
harto, more and more people are being arrested and tried 
for rebellion. The number of tapols in West Papua is now 
increasing faster than anywhere excepting East Timor. 
At the other end of the archipelago, Aceh on the north-
ern tip of Sumatra (devoutly Muslim, unlike the Christian 
populations of East Timor and West Papua) was also an 
arena for resistance to rule from Jakarta. Whilst East Timar 
and West Papua have enjoyed varying degrees of attention 
from the international community, Aceh has been virtually 
ignored in spite of a veritable tidal wave of information 
about massive human rights abuses during the eighties and 
especially from 1989 until 1992. Much of what T APOL 
reported in those years has come back to haunt us, now that 
the veil of silence and fear has been lifted with the down-
fall of Suharto, and the Acehnese are coming forward in 
their thousands to testify about what happened during those 
years of unmitigated terror. 
While all these ghastly abuses were going on which 
TAPOL regularly reported to the Foreign Office, there was 
no let-up in British support for the Suharto regime, mani-
fested first and foremost by the constant flow of military 
equipment - combat aircraft, naval vessels, rapier missiles, 
electronic - to bolster the Indonesian armed forces in the 
pursuit of its internal security operations. 
T APOL has campaigned hard to protect the many hun-
dreds of Acehnese who fled to Malaysia to seek political 
asylum. The Mahathir government has remained deaf to 
pleas for the UN High Commission for Refugees to be al-
lowed to assess their claims for political asylum. In viola-
tion of international law hundreds of been forcibly repatri-
ated. We now work closely with Suaram in Kuala Lumpur, 
to publicise the plight of these refugees. 
Offering a broader analysis 
It was also during the 1980s that TAPOL began to pro-
vide a broader analysis of the political and economic situa-
tion in Indonesia. while maintaining its focus on human 
rights. We felt that the abuses of the regime could not be 
properly understood without an analysis of the workings of 
the Suharto regime, its shifts in political alliances, its eco-
nomic policies and its burgeoning dependence on foreign 
aid. We have also published profiles of the figures who 
Suharto has relied on, and discarded, in pursuit of lasting 
power and to satisfy the greed of his coterie of offspring 
and cronies. Some of those we profiled are now yester-
day's men, hardly worth a footnote in history, while oth-
ers, notably B.J. Habibie. a Suharto protege, now has the 
unenviable task of trying to extricate Indonesia from its 
ever-worsening economic crisis. 
We also have devoted much space to interviewing East 
Timorese and West Papuans whose accounts have added 
flesh and blood to the reports that have filled the pages of 
our periodical publication. 
In 1986, we produced jointly with Survival Interna-
tional a special issue of The Ecologist devoted to Indone-
sia's transmigration programme and it deleterious impact 
on the land rights and livelihoods of the native people at 
the receiving end of this programme. This led in the fol-
lowing year to the establishment of Down-to-Earth, a 
campaign to promote ecological justice in Indonesia. 
Down-to-Earth is now a flourishing campaign with a 
newsletter of its own focusing on tribal peoples, mining, 
pollution and forestry. 
Since 1995, we have carried out research on key aspects 
of Britain's relationship with Indonesia. This resulted in a 
pamphlet, Partners in Repression: The Reality of British 
Aid to Indonesia. The next project focused on British in-
vestments in Indonesia which was published in a briefing 
titled: Ethics, Investments and Repression: Britain and In-
donesia - the Test for Government and Business, at the 
time of the Second ASEM conference .in London in April 
1997. We have also worked closely with Ann Clwyd MP 
who has pursued British governments, Conservative and 
Labour, relentlessly on their aid programme, their training 
of the Indonesian police and the continuing flow of mili-
tary equipment to the Indonesian armed forces. In alliance 
with academics and students at Kings College in London, 
we succeeded in preventing a training course for Kopassus 
officers from going ahead in 1996. 
We have submitted comments to several parliamentary 
Select Committees and keep a number of MPs from all 
parties informed about developments in Indonesia. 
Keeping going 
As a campaign without a membership structure or local 
br~nches, ~ A~OL has depended primarily on networking 
with orgamsat1ons and groups in Indonesia, with NGOs in 
the UK and with solidarity groups around the world. 
For the first two decades, networking in Indonesia was 
virtually impossible because TAPOL was branded as 'PKI' 
and few groups wanted to risk being associated with us. 
While PK! prisoners and released prisoners were no doubt 
grateful for. our effort~, few were prepared to say so, for 
fear of addmg to their problei:ns m a society where the 
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'co~munist menace' was (and still is) a constant theme of 
regime propaganda. 
Sin~e the mid the 1990s however, things have changed 
dramatic~lly . During the past decade, our links with many 
groups in Indonesia have flourished as ' PKI ' scare-
~~ngering has ceased to impress a new generation of ac-
tivists untrammelled by the fears that haunted their prede-
cessors and who can see for themselves that T APOL is not 
and indeed never was, an offshoot of the PKI. Our link~ 
with the new generation of NGOs and political groupings 
have been enhanced by several visits to Indonesia by staff-
member Liem Soei Liang, who managed to enter the 
countr~ despite being blacklisted. (His most recent attempt 
was fotled by none other than the ABRI commander him-
self.) 
Our links with pro-democracy NGOs and political 
groups which had been well established in the final years 
o.f the New Order have flourished in the post-Suharto pe-
riod . We are working with them · on activities to broaden 
understanding in Indonesia about the situation in occupied 
East Timor, on pressing for the re-writing of the history 
(pelurusan sejarah) of 1965 and Suharto's seizure of 
power as well as campaigns to press for the release of all 
political prisoners, without discrimination. 
In the UK, we have for many years worked closely with 
a number of organisations such as Campaign Against Arms 
Trade, the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, World De-
velopment Movement, Survival International, Partizans, to 
mention but a few. This has been the most effective way of 
reaching out to the British public. 
Internationally, we are part of the worldwide solidarity 
movement for East Timar, with groups supporting the 
struggle of the people of West Papua and, most recently, 
with groups supporting the democracy struggle in Indone-
sia. 
Finally, a word about funding. In the early days, our 
founding member had to make do with a kitchen table and 
support from her late sister, Miriam, and other members of 
her family. In 1977, the organisation received a handsome 
shot-in-the-arm when an anonymous supporter, whose 
identity we have never been able to discover, made over to 
us $15 ,000 from a legacy. Able at last to employ a part-
time worker supported by several volunteers, the organisa-
tion turned to overseas funding agencies in Denmark, Ire-
land and The Netherlands. Its chances of raising cash in the 
UK have always been circumscribed by the Charities' Law 
which prohibits British funding agencies with charitable 
status from supporting organisations whose activities are 
deemed to be 'political'. 
We were also helped by the sizeable award to our 
founding member when she received the Right Livelihood 
Award in 1995. 
We have gone through difficult times but in the end, 
with the support of agencies in a number of countries, we 
have always managed to pull through. Even in our darkest 
days, there has always been a fund of goodwill for our 
work and an appreciation of the need to campaign world-
wide to expose the human rights violations perpetrated by 
Indonesia's rulers against their own people and against 
those living under its rule in East Timar, West Papua and 
Aceh. 
The downfall of Suharto has left the country in a state 
of great confusion. The country is mired in a grave eco-
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nomic cris is as a res ul t of the cronyism fostered under Su-
harto. Tens of millions have lost their jobs and been pau-
perised, with the result that social unrest is rife. 
While some democratic rights have been restored, the 
Habibie Government still retains many of the trappings of 
Suharto ' s New Order regime. The armed forces have been 
comprehensively exposed and condemned in Indonesia fo r 
their many atrocities and are on the defensive. Their rep u-
tation has never fallen so low as it is today, yet they clearly 
have no intention of relinquishing their ' special ro le' in 
political and social affairs , known as the dwifungsi, or dual 
function. 
Hundreds of political prisoners are still being held . The 
releases so far have been aimed more at impressing the 
country' s foreign financiers than ending the blight of po-
litical imprisonment once and for all. The East Timorese 
people are still far from their aspiration for an act of self-
determination. The people of West Papua are raising their 
voices in favour of independence, and are being treated 
like traitors for daring to do so. 
The truth about the many atrocities perpetrated during 
the 32 years of Suharto rule is now coming to light, in 
Aceh, West Papua, East Timor and in Indonesia, going 
back to the massacres of 1965/65 and the massacre of 
Muslims in 1984. For far too long, members of the armed 
forces have acted with impunity and demands for the kill-
ers to be called to account are growing. 
The truth about how Suharto came to power in 1965 is 
now under public scrutiny, the focus of attention for histo-
rians and activists, and is being discussed in the press al-
most daily and at public meetings in Jakarta. Hundreds of 
thousands were killed and hundreds of thousands more 
were imprisoned and are still being stigmatised for ' crimes' 
they never committed and should have their names reha-
bilitated. 
All these are issues that will occupy TAPOL in the 
months and years to come. * 
TAPOL's anniversary 
celebrated in Jakarta 
A pubhc meeting was held in Jakarta on 20 October 
to ~elebrate T APO L's 251h anniversary. The meeting, 
which was convened by MIK, the Indonesian Society for 
Humanitarianism, was addressed among others by 
Poncke Princen, a leading human rights activist, and 
Joe~oef Ishak, a long-term, untried political prisoner 
dun~g the ea_rly years of ~he New Order regime. Helmy 
Fauz1, a leadmg human nghts activist, gave an account 
on T APO L's work based on his own experience when 
he visited London last year. The event was reported in 
the Indonesian press, including the leading daily Mer-
deka, that also made a long report about T APO L's ac-
tivities over the past 25 years. 
· TAPOL Bulletin No. 149/150, December 1998 9 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
TAPOL's anniversary celebration 
On 20 October, about 200 supporters attended a public meeting in London to celebrate TA POL 's 
25th anniversary and to hear the views of distinguished speakers on the past, present and future for 
the people of Indonesia and East Timor at this critical time of transition. 
The meeting was addressed by Jose Ramos Horta, the 
1996 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Wilson, a People's 
Democratic Party (PRO) activist released from Cipinang 
prison. Jakarta in July this year, Ann Clwyd, British 
Labour MP. and Carmel Budiardjo. the director ofTAPOL. 
The film More Than A Milhon J'ears, made by TAPOL 
in 1976. was shown and a T APOL supporter, Tim 
Mottershead, played his own piano composition dedicated 
to East Timor's leader, Xanana Gusmao, Heroic Song For 
)(anana. Lord Avebury TAPOL's Honorary President, 
chaired the meeting. 
Jose Ramos-Horta 
Against the background of the downfall of Suharto and 
the continuing struggle for democracy in Indonesia, East 
Timor's external representative praised the 'extraordinary 
dedication' of T APOL founder, Carmel Budiardjo, and the 
many members of the international solidarity movement 
'who year after year helped the cause of East Timar'. He 
looked forward to the day on which Carmel would be able 
to join him in East Timar, met at the airport by Xanana 
Gusmao in his capacity as President of the new Republic of 
East Timar. 
At the same time he had strong words for Western 
governments complicit in the tragedy of East Timar. He 
paid tribute to the extraordinary role the East Timar 
resistance and people have played in overcoming their 
treatment as a footnote of the Cold War and their sacrifice 
on the altar of pragmatism and realpoltik. 
As the East Timorese were being slaughtered, those in 
London and elsewhere, who preach human rights and 
democracy, did more than turn a blind eye. If that was 
their only crime, 'it would have been a blessing', he said. 
Instead they provided weapons which contributed to the 
killings. But, he went on, 'We survived them all', 
including five US Presidents and several British Prime 
Ministers, among them Margaret Thatcher whom 'it is not 
easy to survive!'. 
The one thing that Horta said disgusted him most was 
seeing how the British and Australian authorities 'went to 
great lengths to cover up what they knew to be a cold 
blooded assassination of their own subjects'. 
'Two young British subjects, journalists were murdered 
[at Balibo, East Timar, in October 1975]. They knew about 
it. They deliberately covered it up. They lie about it year 
after year. To preserve the arms deals, to preserve the trade 
relations. Again I hope that all of this will serve as a lesson 
to change these policies,' he pleaded. 
Wilson photo: Paul Slattery 
With Suharto gone and changes taking place i~ 
Indonesia, Horta said 'we are winning the battle'. Despite 
the way the East Timorese have been treated by the West 
he has no hard feelings or resentment. An independent East 
Timar will be in the best interests of Australia, New 
Zealand, European countries and the US, who will all 
benefit. 
'In the 23 years, after failed policies, we appeal to them 
to support the independence of East Tim or. Indonesia does 
not need East Timar. The Indonesian people do not need 
East Timor. An independent East Timor would be a close 
friend of Indonesia. Thousands of Indonesian soldiers lost 
their lives in East Timar. There are still many thousands of 
Indonesian soldiers in East Timar and many are still being 
killed right now. What is the purpose of it all? ... It is time 
for the UK, Robin Cook, Tony Blair to take the lead ... ' 
Wilson: 'Reconciliation and Democracy 
without ABRl's Dwifungsi' 
In a powerful analysis of the progress of reformasi, the 
former political prisoner stressed that the changes since the 
downfall of Suharto will be meaningless unless the 
fundamental issue of military power is addressed. The 
armed forces, ABRI, must return to barracks and give up 
their social and political role [this role and ABRI's security 
and defence role are together known as dwifungsi, 'dual 
function'], which they have clung onto for more than 30 
years. Reconciliation and democracy can only be 
meaningful if civil society is dominant, he said. 
On 21 May, Wilson and his fellow political prisoners in 
Cipinang prison celebrated the demise of 'one of the 20th 
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century's most brutal dictators' with four ducks 
supplied by Xanana Gusmao. However, initial optimism 
that the new regime would grant amnesties for all political 
prisoners was dispelled by the realisation that the amnesties 
were being used as ' diplomatic trade-offs in exchange for 
financial as-s istance from the IMF and World Bank' . Many 
PK!, Tirriorese, West Papuan, Acehnese, Muslim and PRO 
prisoners were not included. 
The problem, said Wilson, lies in the enduring political 
structures of the old regime, which have put in place ' the 
Suharto regime without Suharto'. As ABRI continue to 
play a leading role, they are able to vet the release of 
prisoners and thwart real reformasi. There were some 
openings during the first five months of the Habibie 
regime, but they resulted from mass pressure which the 
regime was unable to resist. Although it embraced 
reformasi, it did so only to survive and consolidate its 
position of power. 
ABRI is, however, under intense pressure to answer for 
the military v'iolence of the Suharto era. Kontras, the 
Committee for the Disappeared and the Victims of 
Violence, has forced ABRI onto the defensive and the 
political space created by Kontras has given the victims of 
army violence the opportunity to call the army to account. 
The press has helped by reporting atrocities and conducing 
investigations. As a result, ABRI was forced to dismiss Lt. 
General Prabowo for involvement in the abduction of pro-
democracy activists, but that was a small victory used by 
ABRI to stop people calling for an end to its special role. 
The army violence cannot be blamed on procedural 
errors or a lack of discipline . It is systematic and deliberate 
and aimed at protecting ABRl's dwifungsi, said Wilson. 
He warned that ABRI have not stopped doing what they 
can to preserve their political iposition. 'Together with 
some Muslim groups that are very close to the military and 
the Suharto regime, they are now spreading anti-
communist hysteria and trying to sow the seeds of ethnic, 
racial and religious hatred.' 
'They are deliberately creating situations to justify the 
army's assertion that political freedoms lead to anarchy and 
disorder and in this way legitimise ABRI's role as the 
defender of stabi 1 ity,' he said. 
To counter this , the PRO has called for a joint political 
platform to end dwifungsi, which would bring together 
people from all walks of life all over the country. 'All our 
energies, efforts, propaganda and actions must be devoted 
to ending ABRI's social and political role now.' 
Wilson then set out the preconditions for reconciliation: 
the release of all political prisoners; the trial of everyone 
responsible for; the brutalities of the former regime; and the 
ending of AI;lRI's dominant political position in society. 
He warned against ABRI's own version of reconciliation, 
which involved an end to demands for them to answer for 
their crimes under Suharto. 
T APOL - a trustworthy friend of the victims of military 
violence and the brutalities of the Suharto and Habibie 
regimes, 'like a small umbrella, helping t?. pr?tect the 
victims of [the] massacres' - must confront m1htanst power 
which has shown no sign of weakening, he concluded: 
'Political opportunities created by civil society are the 
decisive factor but international pressure can help to 
undermine militarism, which is the enemy of humankind in 
Indonesia, my beloved homeland.' 
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Ann Clwyd MP 
A tireless parliamentary campaigner for the people of 
Indonesia and East Timor si nce Carmel ·first got hold of 
me' in 1989, Ann Clwyd recalled her first visit to East 
Tmior that year. She was able to visit some of the badly 
tortured prisoners in Dili prison and was struck by the real 
commitment of the young men who vowed to rejoin the 
fight whatever happened to them. 
That is why, she said, she is full of admiration for those 
people and others who have endured imprisonment, but not 
given up. ' People like Carmel who know what being in 
prison in Indonesia is all about. People like Jose Ramos-
Horta who have ceaselessly continued the struggle outside 
the country. All those brave people who have been killed in 
the struggle and people who we don't know what happened 
to them but we know they are no longer alive.' 
A well-known and hard-hitting critic of her own party ' s 
policy on arm sales to Indonesia, Ann Clwyd launched a 
stinging attack on the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook. She 
recalled the shock and disappointment she felt when he 
informed her that the Government would not be revoking 
export licences for the sale of Hawk aircraft. We have 
continued to give licences for arms exports and '(E)ven the 
previous administration admitted that once you sell the 
arms you have absolutely no idea what they are going to be 
used for' , she pointed out. 
She condemned previous policy on aid to Indonesia, 
which had resulted in aid being linked to arms sales, 
transmigration and the training of police officers 
subsequently implicated in human rights abuses. 
There must be no compromise for the sake of the people 
who have died in Indonesia and East Timar in the struggle 
for human rights, she insisted. In particular, the people of 
East Timar must be given the referendum to which they are 
entitled. 
Ann Clwyd ended by welcoming the news that General 
Pinochet of Chile is under arrest in London, enabling us to 
look forward to the day on which other evil dictators, such 
as Suharto, are arrested and made to account for their 
crimes against humanity. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
In a brief address, Carmel said she was optimistic about 
the future for the people of Indonesia and East Timor, 
despite the continuing power of the military. There were 
two things signifying a new atmosphere. 
In Jakarta, a public meeting to celebrate T APOL' s 25th 
anniversary was being held by a number of organisations. 
Such an event, with participants stretching across the 
generations, would have been unthinkable under Suharto. 
At the same time, moves are being made through 
conferences, seminars and newspaper articles to rewrite 
history, which has indoctrinated people with the belief that 
what happened in 1965 was a PKI coup and Suharto was 
the saviour of the people. Now is the opportunity to learn 
the truth about what really happened, she said. 
Carmel expressed her delight at having so many friends 
from the early days of·T APOL in 1973 and others who 
have "worked over the years to share the precious evening 
with all staff members ofTAPOL. * 
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25th anniversary tributes 
I ..J political prisoners in Cipinang Prison 
On thi s happy occasion. \\ e fourteen political prisoners 
in Cipinang Prison warmly greet TAPOL on its anniver-
sary . We are not saying this just to be polite . Our incar-
ceration as political prisoners \viii help people understand 
\\hy we speak so frankly . We want to express our gratitude 
to T APOL. an organisation that for decades has been a 
faithful friend from afar. 
We are sure that T APOL as an organisation set up to 
campaign for Indonesian political prisoners will remain 
faithful to the fundamental issue for which it came into 
existence. All the more so today because. although power 
has passed on from Suharto to Habibie. there is no end in 
sight for the political prisoner problem. This only goes to 
show that the Habibie government treats the political ene-
mies of the Suharto regime as its own political enemies. 
And it is absolutely clear that Habibie treats his political 
enemies as dangerous ·criminals'. 
This is why we hope that T APOL will remain faithful 
to us, a partner for those who are silenced in their own 
country. 
Budiman Sudjatmiko, Petrus H. Hariyanto, Jacobus 
Eko Kurniawan, Ignatius Damianus Pranowo, I Gusti 
Agzmg Anom Astika, Bartholomeus Garda Sembiring, 
Suroso, Fauzi Jsman, Xanana Gusmao, Joao Freitas, Asep 
Suryaman, Abdul Latief, Bungkus, Nathaniel Marsudi. 
Xanana Gusmao, CNRT President, 
Commander-in-Chief of FALINTIL 
It is with much emotion that, on behalf of the Maubere 
People, I wish to associate myself with your celebration of 
the 25th anniversary of T APOL and only regret that I am 
not able to be there in person. 
When no one else would bother, when the world was 
looking the other way as the Indonesian military perpe-
trated one of the worst massacres of the twentieth century 
against its own people, Carmel you created a voice for the 
Indonesian political prisoners, and later in defence of the 
growing democracy movement in Indonesia. In the midst 
of the Cold War, TAPOL was not afraid to confront the 
indifference of the international community and their gov-
ernments. 
TAPOL was able to establish itself as a committed, 
credible and tenacious group that always maintained very 
close contact with the people whose suffering and struggle 
it claimed to represent. 
To know that TAPOL was out there to make sure they 
would not fall into complete oblivion has been of great 
comfort to the Indonesian political prisoners in Cipinang 
and other jails ... I can say that in the nante of my Tim~rese 
companions and myself, who are experiencing this solidar-
ity. The knowledge that one's case would appear in the 
pages of TA POL ·s bi-monthly bulletin brought a glimmer 
of hope to people fighting desperation . 
I find it remarkable that TA POL should extend its soli-
darity to the East Timorese people from the lirst day of the 
Indonesian invasion in 1975. Its selflessness enabled TJ\-
POL to evolve with the situation in Indonesia and East 
Timor to best serve the interests of those it defended. This 
generosity touches us profoundly and I wish to . . . express 
the deepest gratitude of the Maubere people and our respect 
before your admirable work . 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, leading novelist 
and former political prisoner 
I wish TAPOL the strength to continue to defend the 
oppressed people of Indonesia who have been robbed of 
their basic human rights . I hope that TAPOL will be a 
source of inspiration for all those with the energy to follow 
your example in defending people everywhere who have 
never or not yet been able to live decent lives as human 
beings. 
TA POL 's very informative bulletin ... has helped the 
world to understand Indonesia, free from the distortions 
coming from official Indonesian sources ... . I personally, 
along with many other readers . . . , am truly grateful. 
Now that the winds of rejormasi are blowing in Indone-
sia thanks to the victory that was won by Indonesia's youth 
and students, others in Indonesia are beginning to follow in 
TA POL' s footsteps. Nevertheless, T APOL continues to 
occupy a place that is unique.' 
Joesoef Ishak, publisher Hasta Mitra 
On behalf of Hasta Mitra and on my own behalf, 
would like to congratulate you on your 25th anniversary. 
My best wishes to all the staff of TA POL and especially to 
you personally as the motivator and inspiration in shoul-
dering the burden of this heavy but noble task humanitarian 
work. Your movement and your publication is worthy of 
the name that you bear in the work you have undertaken to 
uphold justice, freedom and human dignity. 
T APOL has been a thorn in the flesh for the barbaric 
rulers of Indonesia and deprived them of many night's 
sleep, but TAPOL has a place in the hearts of Indonesian 
people who are struggling for democracy. 
Sumatra Human Rights Network 
We congratulate TAPOL on its 25th anniversary .... you 
have proven to everyone how consistent you have been in 
the struggle to uphold and respect the human rights and the 
political rights of the Indonesian people which were tram-
pled on by the New Order regime for 32 years. 
Although a reformasi breeze has begun to blow across 
our beloved country, a member of your staff, Liem Soei 
Liong, was recently refused entry into this country, a 
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country whose wealth has been plundered by Suharto and 
his cronies. We are sure that T APOL will continue to 
struggle in accordance with its mission and its vision. 
Please accept our warmest greetings. 
Stan Newens, MEP 
I have at home a complete collection of TAPOL's 
newsletters from the first issue, which is an invaluable 
source of information on human rights issues in Indonesia 
and East Timor. TAPOL has played an outstanding role 
over the last quarter century and I ... salute its work. 
Noam Chomsky, professor of linguistics 
It is a great personal pleasure to have an opportunity to 
congratulate TAPOL on its 25th anniversary... The infor-
mation and analysis they have provided, and their inspiring 
leadership, have been indispensable for those of us who 
have sought to join them in the struggle for democracy, 
justice and human rights in Indonesia and the territories it 
occupies... Thanks in no small measure to their work, 
dramatic changes are underway, with uncertain outcomes. 
I am confident that T APOL will be in the forefront of the 
difficult struggles that lie ahead. 
Ben Anderson, specialist in Indonesian 
political affairs 
Almost alone at the start, T APOL has worked for 25 
years to unmask the crimes of the [Suharto] regime . .. 
Indeed, it is safe to say that none of the "new" revela-
tions of the past months were not long ago signalled by 
TAPOL. One might think that with Suharto's fall, TA-
POL could sit back on its well-deserved laurels - mis-
sion achieved. But no one who knows its Director Car-
mel Budiardjo, or those who have worked closely with 
her, will expect any such thing. The end of Suharto does 
not mean that the vices of his regime are not continu-
ing ... Sadly one could say that TAPOL's "work is never 
done" .... I would like to convey my feelings of admi-
ration and gratitude for all that it has wonderfully ac-
complished. 
John Taylor, professor of sociology 
'Congratulations and thanks to Carmel and TAPOL for 
all their support for the people of East Timor.' 
Dr Peter Carey, historian 
Tyrannies are not eternal. When the wheel of history 
turns what had once seemed fixed and inevitable, suddenly 
becomes part of the tragic history of the past. Just so with 
Indonesia: in the past few months, since the fall of Presi-
denOSuharto, mass graves are being dug up, torturers and 
rapists put on trial, human rights and political reform eve-
rywhere talked about. Yet we must remember the time 
when the voices who spoke out against tyranny were few .. . 
It was at that darkest time when thousands languished 
in jail and whole communities were buried alive in Irian, 
Aceh and Timor, that a voice was heard in distant London, 
a voice which spoke for those who could not speak. .. Ta-
hanan politik, T APOL, and its founder Carmel Budiardjo 
was that voice .... Having helped bury the 'New Order', 
may its next quarter century see it help to build a just and 
democratic Indonesia. With history as its witness, may its 
name be written in letters of light. 
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John Pilger, writer and film-maker 
When the people of Indonesia and East Timor are fi -
nally free , they will owe much to the unflagging work of 
Tapol, and especially to Carmel Budiardjo, whose brilliant 
determination and courage have lit up the past 25 years. 
Jakob von Uexkull, Right Livelihood 
Award Foundation 
.. TAPOL has been a beacon of light for many, many 
people. And Carmel Budiardjo herself has been a shining 
example of right livelihood in having dedicated herself ... to 
upholding fundamental human values in a part of the world 
where they have been so savagely flouted . T APOL de-
serves the admiration and support of all right-thinking In-
donesians - and of everyone concerned for human rights . 
Sulak Sivaraksa, social affairs activist 
and Buddhist thinker 
... we can reflect on the work of T APOL and other hu-
man rights groups who have vigilantly and bravely held the 
flag of social justice throughout the dark years of oppres-
sion under the Suharto regime. 
It is these voices which not only kept hope alive but 
helped to remind Indonesians ... of the higher ideals of hu-
mankind: fundamental human rights for all and a vision of 
the future in which diverse peoples can live in peace and 
prosperity as one nation. This is an emerging vision in In-
donesia today and one we hope will find form root in the 
new soil of this new era. And so we look forward to the 
further work of T APOL in years to come as this voice of 
conscience calling Indonesians and people all over the 
world to enact a vision of humanity in which individuals 
and societies may retain their distinctiveness while living 
side by side in harmony and mutual respect.' 
Hugh O'Shaughnessy, journalist 
'On the five occasions I have visited Indonesian-
occupied East Timor since l first went there in 1991 to re-
port, I have found the East Timorese desperate to have their 
tragedy told to the outside world. TAPOL, to its great 
credit has helped with splendid effectiveness in that task.· 
The messages were also received from two of TA POL 's 
original sponsors in 1973: 
Lord Archer of Sandwell, Labour peer: · ... we can be 
sure that many hundreds of former political prisoners owe 
their freedom, and even their lives, to TAPOL. The Cam-
paign may well be proud of the past 25 years. But unhap-
pily, its work is not complete .. . .' 
The Rev. The Lord Soper, Methodist preacher and so-
cialist: · . .. (Your) publicity on behalf of the victims of op-
pression in Indonesia and East Timor has ensured a wider 
awareness of their plight and of the evils of the regime un-
der which they suffer. I hope that sufficient pressure can 
be put on the new Indonesian Government to establish a 
just, democratic society in Indonesia where the human 
rights of all are safeguarded; and that before Jong TA POL 
will have achieved its goal.' * 
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Witch-hunt in Java and Madura 
At least 200 people died in Java and Madura in a wave of killings this year. In November mobs at-
~acked Ambonese/Christian communities in Jakarta, killing more than a dozen people and destroy-
mg twenty churches and many Christian schools. These brutal actions are part of a campaign to 
spread instability and instil fear in the population when the need to create civil society is so critical to 
democracy in Indonesia. 
The wave of killings. which started in East Java in 
January. were perpetrated by machete-wielding gangs \vho 
always struck at night. The first killings occurred in the 
surroundings of Banyuwangi and Jember. After some 
\Veeks. villagers started to organise themselves. often tak-
ing the law into their own hands. By October. the killings 
had spread to Central and West Java. The ninja killings. ;s 
they became known. succeeded in creating an atmosphere 
off ear and terror. 
There have been many attempts to explain the back-
ground to these atrocities, but most people believe that 
members of the armed forces, ABRI, are behind the 
slaughter. The killer gangs were masked and dressed in 
black and called ninjas, after the ferocious Japanese martial 
art practitioners. Eyewitnesses insist that the ninja gangs 
are professionals because, especially during the later 
stages, they acted so systematically. 
The victims were carefully selected and their homes 
surrounded and invaded by gangs of up to 20 people after 
the electricity in the village had been cut off. In most cases, 
the victims had their throats slashed. The murderers then 
urged the villagers to join them, creating the impression 
that the targeted person had been the victim of a mass exe-
cution. 
The victims: dukun santet and kyais 
The majority of the victims have been dukun santet 
(traditional healers who practise black magic) and kiyais, 
traditional Muslim leaders, although there are reports of 
local labour activists and people leading land disputes 
having been killed. 
It started with the killing of a number of practitioners of 
black magic. After some time, it was the tum of the kyais. 
These two types stand at opposite poles in Javanese soci-
ety. Dukun santet or witches (mostly men) are part of an 
old Javanese tradition and live among the Javanese aban-
gan, or syncretic Muslims who identify themselves as 
Muslims while adhering to Javanese beliefs; kyais are 
santris or pious Muslims untainted by other beliefs. 
East Java is the heartland of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), ar-
guably the world's largest Muslim social organisation, 
which is based predominantly in rural areas. Although 
kyais nurture a deep distrust of dukun santet practices, 
these contrasting social forces have lived side-by-side 
peacefully for generations. 
As the second wave of killings got underway, fourteen lo-
cal Muslim leaders were found slain within a few days. In 
the absence of attempts by the security forces to ap-
prehend the killers, terrified villagers decided to organise 
themselves and vigilante groups were formed armed with 
pitchforks and scythes. Curfews were declared, check-
points set up and house-to-house searches were organised 
to try to find the ninja-killers . 
Tit-for-tat killings have also been used to settle old 
scores. In some cases, local thugs were hired as hit-men to 
exterminate local people who had been identified as evil 
practitioners of black magic and disrupters of the commu-
nity. With inflation now running at nearly I 00 per cent, hit-
men have been hired for next to nothing. In Jember, two 
killers were apprehended by the police after killing Mat 
Gundul, a villager of Glundengan who was neither a dukun 
nor a kyai. Under interrogation, the men said they had been 
hired by 'HW' for the princely sum of Rp 100,000 (about 
US$12). 
In recent months, the killings have taken a new tum, 
targeting mentally-retarded people and outsiders. In one 
insta?ce, scores of people under treatment in a psychiatric 
hospital were given free rides by strangers, driven hun-
dreds of kilometres away and abandoned. They were then 
assailed as ninjas by the locals and often brutally executed 
in public, because they had no ID. 
Who are the ninja killers? 
The tabloid press have made some absurd claims. The 
black-hooded black-clad assassins are said to have super-
natural powers, capa~le of prowling like cats on rooftops, 
and able to move swiftly and silently. These stories have 
pro~ably been planted by intelligence agents, intent on 
sowmg fear and confusion in the general public. 
The first killings went on for several months till just be-
f~r~ Suharto's downfall. After a few months when no 
k1llm~s occurred, the.y started again in September, this time 
~argetmg local Muslim leaders. The second wave of kill-
ings had a much clearer political agenda. The killer squads · 
:-vere much more professional, and soon analysts were try-
mg to fathom what the background might be. 
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At first, local military leaders claimed that they were 
the offspring of communists, in retaliation for the mass 
mi.rders in 1965 when members of the NU took part in a 
red drive against members of the PKI, the Communist 
Party. The Indonesian military are always ready to blame 
everything on the communist menace, but this time their 
ploy failed. NU leaders said it was ludicrous to speak about 
acts of revenge for events more than thirty years ago. The 
NU leader in East Java, Kyai Hasyim Muzadi, said he was 
convinced that hardliners in the military and officials with 
a strong Islamic agenda were out to create an atmosphere 
of social conflict and chaos. Muhammad Munir, coordina-
tor of Kontras, the organisation that campaigns against po-
litical kidnappings, expressed the opinion that military 
elements are involved. 
It gradually became clear that there was a distinction 
between the killers in the first and second waves. In the 
first wave, when dukun santets were the target, the killers 
were often recruited from local bandits and the unem-
ployed who were given a list of names of people to be ex-
terminated. Not being professional killers, their operations 
were rather crude. The second wave of killings appear to 
have been carried out more professionally. 
However, none of the trained operators have been taken 
into custody by the police. The majority of people arrested 
are locals who were incited into joining in the frenzy. Lo-
cal soldiers are also believed to have been involved but the 
ring-leaders have so far not been apprehended. 
The real motive, instability 
Generally speaking, people see the ni,Ya-killings as a 
logical sequence to the overthrow of Suharto in May. Mar-
zuki Darusman the vice-chair of Komnas Ham, the Na-
tional Commission of Human Rights, sees the ninja kill-
ings as a consequence of the culture of violence that was 
the hallmark of the New Order. In this transitional period, 
the old forces are still struggling against the new forces, he 
says. 
Many people also believe that this campaign is the 
brain-child of Suharto loyalists who have recruited the 
ninja killers, in order to destabilise the fragile political 
situation. The Habibie government is not able to wield the 
iron fist in the way Suharto could. 
ABRI has been widely exposed for its involvement in 
killings, kidnappings and rapes. One of the major demands 
of the reformasi era is for the military to go back to the 
barracks. The sacking of Lt.General Prabowo for involve-
ment in the kidnapping of activists earlier this year was 
certainly a blow, but it did not signal the end of the hard-
line wing in ABRI. While he was commander of the elite 
corps Kopassus, Prabowo increased the corps from 4,000 
to 6,000 men. The new units were given special training in 
counter-insurgency. He also organised para-military gangs 
in several regions, including East Timor. These anti· 
reformasi elements can easily be put to use as killers or to 
destabilise the community. Prabowo also recruited people 
from traditional martial art (pencak-silat) schools and or-
ganised them in para-military groups. All this has only re-
inforced the ingrained tradition of violence. 
Many people in ABRI are unwilling to forego the po-
litical dominance they have enjoyed for more than thirty 
years. The message for the general public is clear: without 
ABRI no one is safe from the likes of ninja killers, only 
ABRI can safeguard law and order. There have been per -
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sistent reports about the defection and disappearance of 
several Kopassus platoons and as yet unsubstantiated 
claims that they were involved in the killings. 
One suggestion is that the campaign is aimed at causing 
conflict within the Muslim community, in particular be-
tween ICMI, the Muslim Association of Intellectuals and 
NU. ICMI is very close to Habibie while NU sees Habibie 
as a transitional figure. 
For a while it looked as if the ploy to create instability 
had worked. Local people together with local NU chapters 
started organising themselves to hunt down the ninja kill-
ers. Frustrated at the ineffectiveness of the security forces , 
local people took matters into their own hands. Strangers 
visiting a village became victims of the mob. In extreme 
cases, strangers who could not produce an ID card were 
butchered by angry mobs. In one case in Malang, a men-
tally retarded man was hacked to death, decapitated and his 
body paraded in the streets. But in the last weeks big public 
rallys in many different places has heightened people ' s 
awareness and understanding of this issue. The ninja-
killings is gradually fading away. 
As many political analysts argue, all these gruesome 
events distract attention from the real issues, investigating 
the wealth of the Suharto family (or more precise the mis-
use of Suharto's money for sinister practices) and abolish-
ing the dual function of ABRI. 
Religion in the service of terror 
The mass actions by the students during the MPR Spe-
cial Session pushed the issue of the ninja-killings into the 
background but a week later, on Sunday 22 November a 
district in northern Jakarta was plunged into chaos when 
people claiming to be members of the Front for the De-
fence of Islam attacked Ambonese Christians employed as 
bouncers to guard a local gambling-hall, on the pretext that 
its activities disrupted Muslim worship. Stones were 
thrown at a local mosque giving credeng:__to.-rumours that 
the mosque had been burnt down. This had the desired ef-
fect of in{laming local passions. Five Ambonese were 
seized and hacked to death and their badly mutilated bodies 
displayed in public. Some imams were seen egging on the 
mobs with shouts of 'death to the infidels'. A local Catho-
lic church was targeted and the incident quickly took on 
the character of a conflict between Muslims and Christians 
and between Javanese and Ambonese. 
Mayhe~ reigned for .. hours with mobs attacking 
c.hurches m several locaht1es and threatening congrega-
tions. In ~ne church, they interrupted a wedding in prog-
ress, causmg everyone to flee . Altogether twenty churches 
and many schools run by Christian organisations were 
burnt down or badly damaged. 
On-the-spot investigations by human rights activists 
suggest that the incident was deliberately provoked. Men 
who had stoned the mosque later turned out to have false 
identity cards identifying them as Christians. 
Fortunately, the frenzy of killing did not develop into 
an inter-ethnic clash in the capital. The incident bore simi-
larities with the killings in East Java, part of the destabili-
sation practices that have plagued Indonesia in the past few 
months. According to The Independent [23 November], 
'vested interests are hiring thugs to slow down refonn by 
stirring up racial and religious tensions' * 
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Wim Wertheim, a man against the stream 
Wim Wertheim, 90, died on 3November1998 after a brief illness. Few people have witnessed all the 
important events of the twentieth century as he did. It shaped his world view and Wim Wertheim be-
came known as somebody who always stood up for the oppressed. His support/or the Indonesian in-
dependence struggle and his relentless campaign against the Suharto regime is deeply enshrined in 
the hearts and minds of n,iany Indonesians who see his death as an unbearable loss. 
Willem Frederik Wertheim was born in 1907 in St. Pe-
tersburg in Tsarist Russia where his father worked for an 
insurance company. Although they were Jewish, his par-
ents brought up him and his brother as Christians. Only 
after leaving Russia did they find out about their Jewish 
heritage though Judaism never played an important role in 
his life. 
An above-average student, Wim Wertheim graduated in 
law at 22 and took his PhD in legal philosophy a year later. 
At the start of the global crisis in 1930, he and his wife 
Hetty moved to the Netherlands East Indies where he 
worked as a judge in Surabaya, bringing him face to face 
for the first time with the injustices of the colonial system. 
He had to contend with different criminal codes which 
treated Europeans as first class citizens. 
In 1936, he became the youngest ever professor at the 
Law Faculty in Batavia (now Jakarta). Through close 
friendships with his Indonesian students, Hetty and Wim 
developed a deep understanding of the national aspirations 
of the pro-independence movement. 
. The Second World War brought tragedy to the 
Wertheim family. Unable to cope with Hitler's fascism and 
anti-Semitism, his parents committed suicide in 1940 but 
Wim heard of the tragedy only after the end of the war. In 
1942, Japan invaded Indonesia and both Hetty and Wim 
were interned and held in prison camps with thousands of 
other Dutch citizens. By the time they were released, Su-
karno and Hatta had proclaimed Indonesia's independence. 
During his three years of Japanese internment, 
Wertheim engaged in profound discussions with other 
Dutch intellectuals, notably Theo van Tijn and Jaap de 
Haas. As a result, Wertheim's political views moved 
sharply to the left and the Wertheims joined the ranks of a 
small minority of Dutch who sided with the Indonesian 
nationalists. 
Sixty years of solidarity with Indonesia 
Back in Holland, he became actively involved in a pres-
sure group called Vereniging Nederland-Indonesie, an as-
sociation that opposed the Dutch colonial wars in 1947 and 
1949 in Indonesia and actively supported the young Indo-
nesian republic. The association had many prominent 
Dutch and Indonesians members. 
In the fifties and sixties Wertheim's academic achieve-
ments soared and he became a sociologist of world re-
nown. Under his guidance, Asian studies in the Nether-
lands were transformed from a discipline dominated by 
colonial-minded academics to a forward-looking discipline. 
He was directly responsible for promoting a variety of dis-
ciplines in Asian studies like history, sociology and politi-
cal science. He helped to found the radical Social and Po-
litical Science Faculty in 1948 and in the early sixties he 
established a new discipline called Non-Western Sociol-
ogy. He became the first professor in this discipline and 
many of his students saw themselves as Wertheimites. His 
specialisms were Indonesia and China and he wrote several 
books and numerous articles on both countries. A topic that 
was close to his heart was peasant revolts in Asia. Com-
bined with his greatly admired teaching skills, Wertheim 
won recognition as one of the country's leading social sci-
entists. 
During the roaring sixties and seventies, he became a 
political activist. During the anti-Vietnam war demonstra-
tions in Holland, Wertheim was a familiar figure in the 
~any teach-ins. The activist student generation of the day 
m Holland cut their teeth politically inspired by the wis-
dom of Wertheim. 
Suharto's seizure of power in Jakarta was greeted with 
great enthusiasm by the West but from the very start, Wim 
Wertheim took a principled stand against the Orde Baru. In 
1968, he became a founder-member of the Dutch Indonesia 
Committee and for many years he was one of its foremost 
activists. 
The fact that he outlived the Orde Baru and lived to see 
Suharto's downfall was one of the greatest pleasures in his 
old age. 
Tracing Suharto's complicity 
Beyond doubt, Wim Wertheim deserves recognition as 
one of the most prominent anti-Suharto campaigners. Re-
lentlessly over the years he campaigned against the Orde 
Baru, demanded the . release of the political prisoners, 
ca~led for an en? to aid for the Suharto regime and cam-
paigned for the nght of self-determination for East Timor. 
But Wertheim also became known as one of the first 
who doggedly tried to piece together the facts about the 
events in October 1965: the so-called Untung Coup the 
killing. of six generals and the takeover by Suhart~. In 
1968, m an lengthy interview with Le Monde, Wertheim 
produced the first evidence of the close relationship be-
tween Suharto and the Untung plotters. The 1965 tragedy 
later known as the G30S affair, became a heated issu~ 
~mong many Indonesianists. It became part of Wertheim's 
hfe works to prove Suharto's involvement in the 1965 
events and over the years, he produced many articles on 
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the topic. In 1995 he gave enthusiastic encouragement to 
the production and publication of Tragedi Kemanusiaan, a 
600-page book by M.R.Siregar, the first comprehensive 
account in Bahasa Indonesic:t of the events in 1965. TAPOL 
published the book. 
Campaigning on Indonesia in the seventies and eighties 
was a lonely quest, especially as compared with issues like 
South Africa and Chile. Suharto was hailed as a beacon of 
stability for western investors and western governments 
applauded his staunch anti-communism credentials. Cam-
paigners in the Indonesia Committee were seen by main-
stream politicians as part of the world Communist move-
ment. The mainstream press generally lumped Wim 
Wertheim in this basket as well, although he never joined 
any political party. The press were in two minds about how 
to treat this stubborn, elderly Dutchman: on one hand he 
was a left-winger with contemptible ideas but on the other, 
he had impeccable academic credentials. 
Wertheim's consistent views on the Suharto dictator-
ship have proven to be correct but more often than not, the 
mainstream press in Holland, nurturing their deeply-held 
prejudices, refused to give him the space to air his views. 
We in TAPOL cherish a long and fruitful working rela-
tionship with Wim Wertheim. He wrote a number of arti-
cles for TAPOL Bulletin and frequently shared his thoughts 
and resources with us. 
Wertheim's message to TAPOL 
Since its establishment in 1973, I have been closely in-
volved in the highly significant work accomplished by 
TAPOL. From the early 1980s, in spite of the fact that 
most tapols had been released, its continuation was as im-
portant as hitherto since nothing had basically changed as 
far as the lack of human rights under the Suharto New Or-
der regime was concerned. 
'Has the situation changed basically since Suharto's 
fall. .. ? There are still are a good many political prisoners 
still in jail, some of whom have been imprisoned for 30 
years. But what counts most of all is that the central role of 
ABRI ... is still unchanged. 
'As long as Suharto's role in the successive coups in 
October 1965 and March 1966 has not been cleared up and · 
the massacres ... in that period have not become a main is-
sue of the reformasi movement, the temporary victory of 
that movement through greater keterbukaan (openness) in 
the Indonesian media, cannot be viewed as guaranteed. 
'The continuation of TAPOL's activity is therefore still 
very necessary.' * 
Active to the end 
Wim Wertheim retired from the University of Amster-
dam in 1972 but remained active both in academia and in 
political affairs. He followed global events closely and kept 
in close contact with the many friends in Indonesia. His 
contacts in Indonesia were not only limited to the older 
generation; many people from the younger generation of 
activists made their way to his day-care home in Wagenin-
gen. 
OBITUAR 
In 1997, his last book, Third World, Whence and 
Whither? was published, taking a strong position against 
the globalisation of the market. Long before the Asian eco-
nomic crisis, Wertheim had already predicted the economic 
meltdown. A few weeks before he fell ill, we told him 
about an important project being prepared in Jakarta: the 
first serious effort to cope with the 1965 tragedy and to 
rewrite history according to the facts . Wertheim was 
brimming with enthusiasm and said he would go to Jakarta 
to give a lecture on the topic. Alas, that was not to be. 
Wim Wertheim is no longer with us. We have lost a 
personal friend and a political mentor. We will have to get 
used to the fact that he is no longer there to answer the 
phone and advise us on many different matters. 
We remember him as a man of grand ideas, a strategic 
thinker. We can best serve his memory by continuing to 
work on his visionary ideas. * 
Liem Soei Liang 
continued from page 30 
and home to Mobil Oil Indonesia. 
In the afternoon ABRI arrived with reinforcements and 
sealed Lhokseumawe off for three hours. Incidents like this 
are being used by ABRI to justify increasing the number of 
troops in the region. 
Shoot-out at Kandang 
Two weeks later, on 15 November, there was a shoot-
out i? Kandang. The anti-riot police Brimob were allegedly 
seekmg to arrest a GAM leader who recently returned from 
Mala~sia. The sho~t-out which took place very early in the 
mommg resulted m two deaths - one Brimob and one 
member of GAM. A number of villagers were taken to 
hospital with bullet wounds. * 
continued from page 26 
Indonesian troops should be withdrawn ~ro East Timor 
and c~lled on the United N.ations to place peace-keeping 
force m .the country t.o mom to: ~h.e repress· e actions of the 
Indonesian army agamst the c1V1han popy ation. 
.After 24 hours, the students marched to the governor's 
residence t? dem~nd permission to enter the area. They 
succeeded m holdmg face-to-face talks with the governor 
and the military commander who agreed to allow student 
representa~h,:es to. take part in a joint investigation into the 
reported k11l~ngs m Al~s, along with human rights groups. 
Although this was hailed as a victory for the students 
many of their supporters were sceptical about the chance~ 
of this happening. [The Irish Times, 25 November] 
Meanwhile, under pressure from foreign governments 
who were pressing for information through their embassies 
in Jakarta, the military commander Colonel Suratman an-
nounced on 21 November that military operations in Alas 
were to end. A spokesperson for the Peace and Justice 
Com~ission told The Irish Times he feared that even if 
they did end, they would only shift to other areas. 'There is 
no substantial change in how the military arrest, interrogate 
and torture people.' he said. * 
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The findings of the TGPF 
After being twice postponed, the findings of the TGPF (Joint Fact-Finding Team) were eventually 
made public in early November. Its task was daunting: to explain what happened during the hectic 
days in May just prior to Suharto's removal from power, days which were marred by riots, large-
scale looting and the mass raping ofmost(l' Chinese women. Its findings had been eagerly awaited. 
Initially, human rights organisations had serious mis-
givings about the TGPF, the Joint Fact-Finding Team, 
primarily because it had been set up by five government 
departments. The outrage at home and abroad as ne\'vs of 
the riots and rapes began to emerge forced the government 
to initiate an inquiry. This is how the TGPF was born. Its 
brief was to undertake an investigation and make recom-
mendations, though it would be up to the government to 
decide whether or not to act on the recommendations. 
The Team started its work on 23 July. The members in-
cluded three army officers and two police officers as well 
as representatives from the justice and home affairs de-
partments, the foreign ministry, the department for 
women's affairs and the attorney-general's office. Non-
governmental organisations were also represented includ-
ing the NU, the main Muslim organisation, and several 
civil society organisations such as the Legal Aid Institute 
YLBHI, Elsam, APIK and the Volunteers Team for Hu-
manity. Marzuki Darusman of the Komnas Ham, the Na-
tional Commission of Human Rights, was chosen to chair 
the Team. 
When the TGPF called a press conference on 3 No-
vember to announce its findings, hundreds of people from 
the press and the public were present but the four cabinet 
ministers and the Attorney-General who should have been 
there to receive the report were conspicuous by their ab-
sence. It was not difficult to conclude that they already 
knew that the findings would be very damaging to the gov-
ernment and ABRI. 
One of the fundamental flaws of the Team was the in-
clusion of several people from ABRI. The most critical 
question for the Team was to examine the involvement of 
sections of the security apparatus in those horrific events in 
May. Some human rights organisations refused to partici-
pate on the grounds that the TGPF lacked independence 
while others decided to participate, arguing that the inves-
tigations should not be left to the authorities. Tim Relawan, 
the NGO which had done so much to monitor the acts of 
violence, hesitated but in the end was persuaded to join 
after a special plea was made to Father Sandyawan, the 
group's coordinator, known widely as Romo Sandy. 
State violence 
Not long after the May events and long before the 
TGPF was set up, Tim Relawan had announced its own 
findings which were widely reported in the press. [See TA-
POL Bulletin, No 148, September 1998] Tim Relawan un-
tuk Kemanusiaan (Team of Volunteers for Humanitarian 
Causes) is widely respected and has a large network of 
volunteers. It has won esteem for its reliability in monitor-
ing many human rights abuses especially at the time of the 
assault on the headquarters of the POI in July 1996. 
The Tim Relawan 's conclusions were that the violence 
in May was systematic and well organised. Witnesses had 
testified that there were men inciting people to loot and 
burn property and participate in gang-rapes. They were 
described as muscular men wearing military boots who 
looked very much like hit-men. 
In a statement to members of the US Congress during a 
visit to Washington earlier this year, Romo Sandy said that 
the May tragedy was part of a series of events having their 
roots in the elite politics of the Orde Baru. The Tim Rela-
wan 's investigations had led them to conclude that a fierce 
power struggle was underway at the time of the riots. 
Romo Sandy said that bloodbaths and riots were part of a 
pattern of bloodshed that characterised politics during the 
Orde Baru. Many political observers in Indonesia had con-
cluded that Suharto loyalists and Suharto himself were 
.worried about the growing ferment of protest which had 
spilled onto the streets . They believed that by provoking 
violence and mayhem, it would be possible to justify the 
imposition of martial law. But internal ABRI conflicts and 
the strength of opposition in civil society put paid to these 
intentions. 
The death of Ita Marthadinata 
By adopting such a strong position against the security 
apparatus, Tim Relawan became one of the spearheads 
challenging militarism, making it the target of dark forces. 
During the course of their investigations, several leading 
members of the Tim Relewan had received mysterious 
phone-calls and other forms of harassment warning them 
not to continue. 
The intimidation continued after the TGPF started its 
own investigations and came to a head with the murder 
(date???) of lta Marthadinata, an 18-year old high school 
student and active member of Tim Relawan just as the 
TGPF investigations had reached a critical point. Ita's 
mother helped run a Buddhist centre that was providing 
counselling for the rape victims and she and her daughter 
were planning to escort four rape victims to the US to tes-
tify. 
Ita was found dead in her room with multiple stab 
wounds and a slashed throat. Her death inevitably spread 
fear among Tim Relawan volunteers many of whom re-
fused to continue with their work. 
Ita had hardly been laid to rest before the authorities 
started a smear campaign. In clear violation of professional 
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ethics, Sarlito, a senior psychologist close to the military, 
alleged in a statement to the press that a post-mortem had 
shown that lta had been sexually active and was probably a 
drug addict. Acting with a speed that rarely distinguishes 
police investigations, a young man living next door was 
taken into custody and charged with lta's murder. It was 
clear that the authorities were bent on creating the impres-
sion that lta 's murder was just a straight-forward crime. 
The impact of lta's tragic death was devastating for the 
TGPF, making the task of cross-checking the Tim Rela-
wan's findings almost impossible. Some rape victims 
changed their minds about testifying or simply disappeared 
and several docto"rs who were treating rape victims now 
denied that this was so. 
TGPF's impossible task 
In a way TGPF was replicating the investigations that 
had already been carried out by the Tim Relawan. The con-
clusions by the Tim Relawan had been widely acclaimed 
and had further eroded ABRI's image. During the Suharto 
era, independent fact-finding teams had been set up by 
NGOs but their conclusions had been largely ignored. On 
the few occasions when ABRI had been compelled to carry 
out investigations, the findings were nothing more than a 
whitewash with a few low-ranking soldiers taking the 
blame for horrific bloodbaths such as the Santa Cruz Mas-
sacre in November 1991. 
The composition of the TGPF did little to inspire con-
fidence that now, things would be different. In theory the 
Team's investigations were supposed to be confidential but 
there were a number of leaks, highlighting conflicts be-
tween members of the Team about practically everything, 
in particular the political thrust and the conclusions of its 
report. The ABRI members refused to accept that the riots 
and mass rapes had been systematic, a clear example of 
violence perpetrated by the state apparatus . Although the 
contradictions were deeply entrenched, the TGPF eventu-
ally reached a compromise. After three months' work and 
two postponements, the findings were made public on 3 
November. 
The Team concluded that the riots had been provoked 
by provocateurs who were not local people and who identi-
fied the targets, were trained in the use of instruments of 
torture, had the means to communicate with each other. It 
said that there was evidence that implicated members of 
the security forces. 
Prabowo and Sjafrie to go on trial? 
·However, at his press conference, the TGPF chair 
Marzuki Darusman went much farther. He made it clear 
that members of the military and political elite were di-
rectly involved in the riots and had instigated the atrocities 
in the hope that by provoking chaos, they could justify the 
imposition of martial law. Marzuki mentioned the name of 
Lt General Prabowo, Suharto ·s son-in-law, suggesting that 
he might have been the brains behind the op~e~ation~ An-
other name mentioned who also. like Prabowo. was a sen-
ior member of Kopassus, the notorious red berets elite 
troops. was Major-General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin \\ho ''as 
the military commander of Jakarta at the time of the riots. 
He said that these officers should be held responsible for 
the riots. Regarding Sjafrie in particular. Marzuki said that 
he should take responsibility for the fact that the sen1rity 
forces under his command had done nothing ll' l'l'ntain thl.' 
spread of violence. With such strong accusations lcwllcd 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
against him, the chances are that Major-General Sjafrie 
could soon face prosecution. The chances of Prabowo fac-
ing court-martial fo llowing his expulsion from the army 
appear to have diminished as he is now reported to be in 
Germany 'for reasons of health '. 
Another burning issue raised by Marzuki was a myste-
rious meeting or series of meetings that took place at the 
headquarters of Kostrad, the army' s strategic command, on 
14 May, while t?e rioting and rapes were at their height. 
S~ve~al top-ranking army officers including Prabowo and 
Sjafne and a number of civilians including the lawyer 
Buyung Nasution, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, Prabowo's 
brother, and others were present the meeting. Analysts 
suggest that ~ther, more strategic meetings took place on 
the same day m Kostrad. The discussions which took place 
still remain a mystery . 
Mass rapes 
The TGPF came to the conclusion that 85 persons had 
been victims of sexual violence, of whom 52 had been 
rap~d . Fifteen of.the 52 victims of rape had given personal 
testimony or the1r cases had been verified by the Indone-
sian Medical Association. The other 37 cases were based 
on evidence from family members, witnesses or medical 
counsellors . Given the pressure under which it had oper-
ated. it is a wonder that the TGPF was able record so many 
cases. Members of the Assistance Team which had under-
taken the investigations on behalf of the TGPF later com-
mented that if they had 'been given more time, they would 
have been able to track down many more victims. Consid-
ering its limitations. the TGPF is to congratulated for 
achie\'ing these results. This is a victory for civil society 
and a defeat for the military . * 
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THE 1965 AFFAIR 
Suharto's role in the 1965 coup 
'Pelurusan sejarah' or 're-writing history' is very much in the air in post-Suharto Indonesia. And 
what people mean by this is re-writing the history of the events in October 1965 which brought Su-
harto to power. Among those now accusing Suharto of direct involvement are even people who 
served in his government for years. 
For 32 years, the New Order regime has kept a tight lid 
on the history of Suharto's seizure of power. The official 
version asserts that the kidnap and murder of six army gen-
erals on the night of 30 September - 1 October 1965 was 
masterminded by the Indonesian Communist Party, the 
PKI, that Major-General Suharto speedily mobilised his 
KOST RAD and RP KAD troops to foil troops under the 
command of the 'G30S' (30 September Movement) rebel-
lion, and that three months later, on 11 March 1966, the 
then president, Sukarno, handed over full powers to him in 
a letter, on the basis of which he proceeded to ban the PKI 
and its associated mass organisations and to arrest a num-
ber of ministers appointed by Sukarno. 
Nothing is written in Indonesian history books about 
the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of alleged commu-
nists and the arrest and persecution of hundreds of thou-
sands more, or the conviction of hundreds of people by 
kangaroo courts that have led to dozens of people being 
judicially executed or held in prison for decades. (Ten 
1965 convicted prisoners still remain in prison of whom 
four are under sentence of death; all ten were arrested in 
the late 1960s.) 
The G30S/PKI spectre 
The spectre of the G30S/PKI and the PKI's alleged 
murderous conspiracy has been used to terrorise the entire 
population and prevent discussion about what really hap-
pened. School history books are all based on Suharto's ver-
sion, there are museums and monuments dedicated to 
driving home the same message. School children have been 
taken to these 'sacred' places to din the message in, and for 
more than fifteen years, all TV companies have been re-
quired to show a four-and-a-half hour film on 1 October, 
giving a grotesque depiction of the heinous deeds of Indo-
nesian communists and their allies. 
As a former political prisoner once wrote in TAPOL 
Bulletin: 
Here in Indonesia, people are still misled by symbols, 
primarily the G30S/PKI symbol. ... It is a matter of life and 
death for the Suharto military regime which now rules the 
country to prevent their lies surrounding the symbols from 
being exposed for what they are. The patriotic forces of the 
people will not be able to restore democracy in Indonesia 
as long as the G30S/PKI symbol still clouds their vision, as 
long as we regard the symbols created by the regime as 
sacrosanct. [TAPOL Bulletin, No 71, September 1985] 
Autopsy cover-up 
One member of the team of forensic experts which ex-
amined the bodies of the generals murdered by the G30S 
conspirators has now spoken publicly about the results of 
the autopsies which were never made public in Indonesia. 
To understand the significance of his testimony, it 
should be recalled that immediately after 1 October 1965, 
the armed forces fuelled the flames of anti-communist 
hysteria by alleging that the bodies of the murdered gener-
als had been mutilated, that their eyes had been gouged and 
the penises slashed. Women from the left-wing women's 
organisation, Gerwani were alleged to have perpetrated 
these atrocities, setting the stage for a fanatical wave of 
killings against a movement whose women affiliates had 
supposedly engaged in such horrific practices. These 
claims which were published widely in the army-controlled 
press helped whip up the frenzy that led to the wave of 
killings in 1965/1966 which left up to a million communist 
suspects dead. 
Professor Arif Budianto was the youngest member of 
the seven-man team that carried out the autopsies, the only 
surviving member still living in Indonesia. He was col-
lected from his home on the evening of 4 October 1965 by 
a company of troops from KOSTRAD - then under the 
command of Suharto - driven to the military hospital, and 
taken to the autopsy room to examine the bodies of the six 
generals and one sentry killed on 1 October. They worked 
through the night in order to complete their work by the 
morning. He said that Major-General Suharto was present 
in the room for much of the time. 
His own examination of the body of General Y ani 
showed that the eye-balls had come loose from the sockets 
but this was because the body had been submerged in wa-
ter for several days, not because they had been gouged out. 
. Because they had read reports in the press that the pe-
mses had been slashed, they examined the penises very 
carefully but found no evidence of incisions or cuts. All the 
sexual organs were intact and they were able to confirm 
that one of the victims had not been circumcised. 
The bodies bore many bullet wounds which were 
clearly the cause of death. Some were badly bruised but 
this was probably because they had been thrown down the 
well in Lubang Buaya where the conspirators had their 
headquarters. 
'W~en it came to writing up our findings, we were all 
very fnghten.ed ab?ut the consequences of our findings. 
The reports ctrculatmg about the bodies were clearly untrue 
and greatly exaggerated. As the youngest member of the 
team, my turn to speak came last. I said that our duty was 
to the state and the Almighty so we would have to tell the 
truth. I stressed this and said that if we were later accused 
of doing something wrong and landed up in prison, so be it. 
But I felt convinced that if we told the truth, this would not 
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happen. However, the truth about our findings was never 
made public here in Indonesia although our findings were 
later published in the US. ' [Forum Keadilan, 3 October 
1998] 
The reference here is to the publication in the Cornell 
University publication, Indonesia of the seven autopsies 
translated by Ben Anderson who discovered the documents 
while browsing through some trial records. The detail s 
tally with what Professor Budianto has said, though the 
fear and anguish experienced by the forensic experts has 
only now been described . His account also reveals that Su-
harto closely monitored the work of the autopsy team and 
knew about their findings but decided to conceal them 
from the public so that he could go on lying about the 
'<..kpravities of the Gerwani women '. 
Dewi Sukarno on Suharto's two coups 
One of the many people with a different explanation of 
what happened is Dewi Sukarno, the Japanese-born widow 
of President Sukarno. who spent the days leading up to 1 
October with her husband. In a well-attended press confer-
ence in Jakarta, she described how stories were circulating 
at the time about a 'Council of Generals' which was about 
to launch a coup against the President. On hearing this, 
some hot-headed middle-ranking officers, including Lt-
Colonel Untung from the Cakrabirawa palace guard, de-
cided to capture several generals and bring them to the 
head of state to answer for these plans. 'I ' m absolutely 
certain they wanted to protect Sukarno though their way of 
doing it was very wrong. I am quite sure they never told 
the soldiers who captured the generals to murder them. ' 
Jn those early days, it was immediately alleged that the 
PKI was responsible although there was no proof at all. 
Suharto then sent out his men to carry out massacres which 
led to the slaughter of 1.2 million people during the next 
four years. 
'It was Suharto who committed the major betrayal be-
cause he refused to carry out the instructions of his superior 
(Sukarno). 1 October is the day on which Suharto carried 
out his first coup against Sukarno.' This refers to Sukarno's 
instruction to General Pranoto .... to head the army which 
Suharto refused to recognise, instead taking over command 
of the army himself. 
The second Suharto coup, she said, took place on 11 
March 1966 when a cabinet meeting was underway at the 
palace in Jakarta. The palace was surrounded by unidenti-
fied troops, forcing Sukarno to escape by helicopter. 
'When he arrived at the Bogor Palace, that too was in the 
hands of the army and three generals were there waiting for 
him. The two presidential palaces were occupied by troops. 
If that's not a coup, then what is?' 
Suhar10 has been unable to produce the letter signed by 
Sukarno in Bogor on 11 March, allegedly giving him full 
powers. One of the mysteries much .talked about over the 
past few years is that the original of this document, Su-
karno's 11 March 1966 Instruction to Suharto, has been 
'lost'. 
Dewi Sukarno also accused Suharto of plotting the 
slow death of her husband. She herself was forced to leave 
the country while Sukarno was kept under close guard 
while his health deteriorated. 'I was not allowed to return 
until I 8 June 1970, by which time he was in a deep coma. I 
pleaded with his five doctors to treat him but ~hey sai~ t~ey 
were unable to do anything without Suharto s perm1ss10n. 
[Waspada, 8 October 1998] 
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Ex-minister on Suharto's involvement 
. 
A former minister who served in several of Suharto 's 
cabinets after 1965 and was al so deputy speaker ofthe Su-
preme Consultative Assembly, the MPR, told a public 
meeting in Jakarta that he had evidence to show that Su-
harto in 1965 was acting in collaboration with the US and 
UK secret services, the CIA and MI6. 
Mashuri , who was minister of information and later 
minister of education in two post-1965 cabinets, told a 
seminar held to discuss 'Suharto' s Role in Indonesian 
History' that Suharto maintained links with the US and UK 
secret services through Dr Budiono Kertapati , an operative 
of the Dutch secret service. Mashuri also spoke at length 
about Suharto ' s links with one of the G30S conspirators, 
Colonel Latief, who informed him two hours in advance of 
their intention to kidnap seven generals (one of whom , 
Nasution , escaped). 
Mashuri, who was .a neighbour of Suharto at the time, 
said that Suharto was not at home when the kidnappings 
occurred but only appeared afterwards. He later clairQed 
that he knew nothing about what was going to hap-
pen .[Republika; 10 November] * 
NEW PUBLICATION 
DARI SUHARTO KE HABIBIE 
Guru Kencing Berdiri, Murid Kencing Berlari: 
KEDUA PUNCAK KORUPSI DAN NEPOTISME 
REZIM ORDE BARU 
By: Dr. George Adicondro 
Order from TAPOL, inside Europe £ 5.00, incl. postage, 
outside Europe£ 7.00 incl. postage 
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Under the Indonesian jackboot 
Leaked army documents confirm that East Timor remains heavily militarised despite per~istent 
Indonesian claims that troop levels have been reduced. They also provide, for the first time, a 
comprehensive picture of the army's structure and the depth of its penetration of East Timorese 
political, economic and social life. 
The 100 pages of documents found their way from East 
Timor to a solidarity activist in Australia in October. They 
originated from the Territorial Military Command in Den 
Pasar, Bali, which commands the Regional Military 
Command in East Timor, Korem 164. No one has denied 
the documents' authenticity, including 'diplomatic sources' 
quoted in the press. 
In general, the documents confirm what we have known 
for many years, that East Timor is a heavily militarised 
country where the armed forces (ABRI) exercise a tight 
grip on everyday life. They prove that ABRI regard East 
Timor as a place where they must maintain a pervasive 
presence to suppress those opposed to the occupation. 
The documents also prove, contrary to official claims, 
that overall troop levels in the territory have increased this 
year and that combat troops, far from being phased out, 
have increased and amount to nearly 40 per cent. of the 
total troop strength. 
They show that the para-military forces are under the 
direct command of ABRI and are not independent 
vigilantes outside the command structure as is usually 
claimed. Furthermore, all the key posts within the civilian 
administration are occupied by army personnel. 
The civil defence units, which are also a key element in 
the control of Timorese society, trained and armed by 
ABRI, are barely mentioned. 
The number of troops 
In August this year, regular soldiers totalled 17 ,941. 
With the addition of the military personnel from the civil 
service and the so-called wanra or 'people's resistance' 
units, the total was 21, 620. 
Since the beginning of Suharto's New Order, the 
Indonesian state has been heavily militarised. However, the 
figures show that the militarisation of East Timor far 
exceeds Indonesia as a whole. In 1995, ABRI had 507,137 
troops for around 200 million Indonesians (I :400). In East 
Timar, it now has nearly 18,000 regular soldiers for no 
more than 700,000 people ( l :56), proportionately seven 
times the number. 
The composition of the troops 
The key tables in the documents divide the troops into 
two categories: organik or territorial troops, who are 
stationed in the territory on a semi-permanent (usually 
three months or longer) basis; and penugasan or combat 
troops deployed from outside to fight the guerrillas and 
quell rebellion in the towns and villages. 
The tables are for November and December 1997 and 
for July, early August and August this year. 
Between November 1997 and August 1998, there was 
an increase of2,029 troops from 15,912 to 17,941 (11.3 per 
cent.), which consisted almost entirely of combat troops. 
These figures give the lie to the much-publicised 
Indonesian claim that troops were reduced in July and 
August and that those remaining were almost all territorial. 
The same tables also include figures for 'non-ABRI' 
civil service and 'people's resistance' forces. While almost 
all the civil service forces were attached to the territorial 
troops, more than 60 per cent of the 'people's resistance 
troops served with the combat troops. These 'non-ABRI' 
forces numbered just under 4,000 and remained virtually 
unchanged over the nine-month period. 
Medical corps personnel, scores of whom were alleged 
to have been brought in to replace the departing combat 
troops in August, amounted to no more than 84 persons. 
In August 1998, just under half the territorial troops 
were attached to the 13 district military commands 
(Kodims), the largest of which were at Baucau, Lospalos 
and Manatuto. A further contingent was spread between 
the 13 police districts, notably at Dili, Baucau and 
Bobonaro 
Most of the remaining territorial troops were serving in 
Battalions 744 and 745. Although these battalions include a 
sizeable number of East Timorese, all the command 
positions are occupied by Indonesian officers. This pattern 
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was introduced following desertions by many East 
Timorese officers holding positions of command in the 
I 980s (see below). 
The combat troops in August included five infantry 
battalions, each of around 985 men, from various parts of 
Indonesia, 'special duty land forces' (Satgas /Jara!) , 
Kopassus commandos (Satgas Trihuana), and ' special duty 
engineers' (Satgas Zipur). 
The Kopas.ms units listed arc known to be trainee units, 
confirming Hrttt East Timor is used as a training ground for 
the army's elite troops. The documents show that there 
was a switch round in Kopassus units between July and 
August, evidence that the troops which departed on 28 July 
in a blaze of publicity were replaced by other elite troops a 
few days later. 
By far the largest number of 'people' s resistance forces ' 
are attached to the Kopassus units, making them the largest 
single contingent of combat troops. 
There is no mention in any of the documents of Menwa 
the student regiments that exist in all Indonesian 
universities. These units, which are directed and trained by 
the local military commands, have the task of keeping a 
close watch on their fellow students . We know for certain 
that there is a Menwa with about 300 members in the 
University of East Timor in Dili . 
Brimob, the riot police 
The role of the police - and in particular Brimob 
(Brigade Mobil, Mobile Brigade), a special police task 
force in charge of riot control - in maintaining public order 
has increased 'recently in an unsuccessful attempt to bolster 
the image of the security forces. Brimob personnel are 
equipped with weaponry such as water cannon and 
armoured personal carriers and in major Indonesian cities 
they have been responsible for much of the brutality 
against peaceful protesters. They have replicated this role 
in East Timar. 
The documents show that more than 1,000 Brimob 
personnel are stationed in East Timor. In August, 633 men 
served in territorial units and 380 were attached to combat 
units. 
Brimob companies continue to arrive in East Timar. At 
the end of October, three companies arrived from Bali and 
Kalimantan 'to help maintain civil order' [AFP, 28 October 
1998]. We do not know if they were replacing other 
Brimob troops, but it is clear that East Timor has a higher 
concentration of riot police per head of population than 
anywhere else in Indonesia. 
The army's presence in every village 
A total of 464 non-commissioned officers (babi11sa) are 
stationed in the villages of East Timor. With a babima post 
in every village, grassroots surveillance is far more intense 
than in Indonesia where as a rule each babinsa post covers 
a group of villages. More than 400 of the babinsa appear to 
be Timorese, though some names suggest that they are 
from West not East Timor. 
-
Ba bins a officers are the ·eyes and ears· of the 
occupation forces, collecting intelligence on a regular 
basis. By using Timorese, ABRI aim to set Timorese 
against Timorese in line with the classic colonial policy of 
'divide and rule'. However, many Timorese babinsas may 
share the sentiments of the villagers they supervise. 
EASTTIMOR 
East Timorese members of ABRI 
The armed force s have sought to emphasise their 
success in recruiting East Timorese, but their policy has not 
been a notable success . 
It is clear for a start that Timorese soldiers are in the 
lower ranks only. There is not a single East Timorese 
above the rank of major. Even the three majors are all ' ex-
Tropas' , former members of the Portuguese army 
disbanded in 1975, likely to be well above active-service 
age . 
More than 90 per cent. (5,505 out of 6,095) of the 
Timorese are corporal s or privates . This is hardly a record 
to be proud of after 23 years of recruitment efforts. Many 
East Timorese who trained as officers are known to have 
deserted over the years, in most cases joining the ranks of 
the armed resistance. 
Battalions 744 (based in Los Palos) and 745 <Baucau) 
are always referred to as 'East Timorese battalions ', but the 
August tables reveal that fewer than one-third of the men 
are East Timorese. The two battalions are also much 
smaller than normal, indicating a failure to recruit 
Timorese in sufficient numbers. The battalions v.·ere set up 
in the early 1980s with members mostly recruited from 
East Timorese civil defence units known as hansips . Many 
officers later deserted, after turning on their •battalion 
comrades'. 
It appears that the Indonesians regard the Timorese 
under arms as a security risk, hence the majority of 
Timorese soldiers are spread out among the territorial 
troops stationed in the 13 military command districts. 
Para-military teams 
The para-military teams, wntch-figur{!- So--aggressively 
in intelligence operations, spying on and helping to capture 
suspects and creating an atmosphere of fear, are likely to 
include a large number of Timorese. They work closely 
with the intelligence units of Kopassus, known as the SGI, 
whose brutal methods of interrogation and torture are 
widely feared in East Timor. 
It is an integral part of the anny's doctrine to rn~ruit 
members of the community to serve the interests of the 
armed forces in so-called ·people's defence· and to 
undermine the resistance of the people by pitting Timorese 
against Timorese. This explains the use of the tenn 
·resistance forces· for these insidious units. 
The listing of 12 teams (one for a4nost every military 
command) in these official army documents nails the lie 
that these para-military forces are not in~orporated as a part 
of ABRI but are 'independently managec'i' vigilante units. 
There is no mention of what is thought to be the largest 
and most infamous para-military group. Gadapaksi. 
Gadapaksi is the · brain-child of former Kopassus 
commander Lt.General Prabowo. Prabowo's recent fall 
from grace may explain why loyalties are shifting. 
Recently. some Gadapaksi hirelings were reported to have 
joined in calls for the resignation of the governor, Osorio 
·Soares, one of Prabowo closest cronies. 
The 13th item on the list of 'resistance forces' consists 
of 54 'respected citizens and local leaders'. These are the 
traditional or informal leaders, possibly including some 
pro-Indonesian priests, which the Indonesians use to 
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bolster their control over the community at large. These 
trad itional leaders are also relied on to 'nu11ure' members 
of the para-military teams. 
Altogether there are 1, 188 para-mi litaries. During the 
period covered by the documents, 11 men were killed in 
action (gugur), which suggests that they are also used in 
armed conflict with the guerrillas. 
ABRI dominates the civil administration 
An August 1998 document lists 83 ABRI officers 
occupying top executive posts and 57 officers who are 
members of the first and second-level assemblies (DPRD-1 
and 13 DPRD-11 assemblies). These are the so-called 
kmya\\'an appointments, which reflect the implementation 
of ABRl's dwifungsi or dual function doctrine. 
The army assembly members are not elected but 
appointed to hold seats set aside for the armed forces, four 
in each of the DPRD-11 assemblies and nine in the DPRD-1 
assembly. As in all regional and district assemblies 
throughout Indonesia and in the national Parliament, the 
army officers are there to control the activities and 
decisions of these rubber-stamp legislatures. 
As for the executive posts, 19 key positions - including 
the Deputy-governor and two assistant governors - are held 
by karyawan appointees in the first-level regional 
administration (Dati-I), and 64 in the second-level or 
district (Dati-1!) administrations. 
Army executives 
The array of officers holding key strategic 
administration posts is part and parcel of the way in which 
the forces of occupation control the population, resources 
and economy. Rui Gomes, who until his defection in 1997 
was Head of Research at East Timor Regional Planning 
Board, told T APOL, 'the kitchen must be rigorously 
controlled by means of a system which manages all the 
colony's physical and human resources'. 
The deputy governor shadows the governor, a post 
which for political reasons has always been occupied by an 
East Timorese. Just as the governor has always been 
Timorese, so his deputy has always been a senior-ranking 
military man. The assistant governors are on hand to ensure 
the smooth running of the governor's office to safeguard 
the vested interests of military and non-military 
Indonesians. 
Ten officers head a range of offices which penetrate 
down to the lowest levels of society (for example, the 
Social-Political Directorate, the State Ideology Directorate 
and its Education Department and the Communications 
Office). Officials have powers to exercise strategic control 
over the people in the conduct of their everyday lives and 
to oversee indoctrination. For example, according to Rui 
Gomes, the Communications Office keeps tabs on all 
official correspondence between the province and Jakarta, 
it handles the affairs of East Timorese given scholarships at 
Indonesian universities and handles the trips to Indonesia 
or overseas of all local government officials. 
Other posts include the chiefs of trade and industry, co-
operatives, and the logistics agency and the director of the 
Regional Development Bank, which together control all the 
colony's economic and commercial activities and 
safeguard the financial resources of army-related business 
activities. 
The head and secretary of the Regional Planning Board 
- Bappeda - control the use of resources and ensure that the 
proceeds of projects are distributed 'f~irly' amon¥ officers, 
officials and business enterprises m East T1mor and 
Jakarta. As a rule, all projects requiring more than Rp. 500 
million are assigned to businesses in Java as businesses in 
East Timor are unable to provide the necessary capital. The 
Bappeda executives determine the funding agencies which 
may operate in East Timor, the types of building projects, 
and the listing of 'poor villages' which is a way of 
acquiring additional funds from Jakarta. 
Local-based executives 
The 64 Dati-11 karyawan appointees include three 
district heads (bupati), three district secretaries, 13 heads of 
social-political departments (one for each district), two 
staff members of social-political departments, 11 heads of 
district civil defence offices, 31 village heads, and one head 
of a district co-operative department. 
Since ten of the thirteen district head posts are occupied 
by non-military East Timorese, visiting journalists and 
diplomats are expected to be impressed. Social and 
political ('sos-pol') control is, however, in the hands of 
karyawan officers through sos-pol offices in every district. 
Sos-pol heads at all levels of the civil administration in 
Indonesia, from departmental ministries down, are 
invariably occupied by active-service or retired ABRI 
officers. 
Surprisingly, there are 31 karyawan village heads, 
positions which, one would have thought, would always be 
held by East Timorese. The 31 villages are not identified, 
but it is safe to assume that they are in highly sensitive 
regions where the security situation is unstable. 
All the karyawan executives function as an extension of 
the military establishment and remain firmly under military 
discipline. Although they wear civilian dress, they do not 
treat their co-workers as equals and expect, and receive, the 
deference due to army personnel. Their presence is a 
constant source of friction and fear in the civilian offices 
which they oversee. 
ABRI could lose most of their karyawan positions in 
East Tim or if the Habibie/ Alatas duo go ahead with their 
offer of autonomy for East Timor. In the Indonesian 
version of autonomy, all the key positions in the 
administration should logically be filled by East Timorese 
which means ABRI will lose much of the iron grip they 
hold over the territory. 
The documents show conclusively that army 
penetration of the provincial and local administration in 
East Timor is overwhelming. The military's dwifungsi 
doctrine is enforced with particular vigour. It is not enough, 
therefore, to call for the withdrawal of all Indonesian 
troops from East Timor. We must also call for the 
demilitarisation of the civil administration and the removal 
of all army appointees holding executive and legislative 
positions. * 
TAPOL is indebted to George Aditjondro for comments on 
the documents, to Andrew McNaughtanfor transcribing these 
comments, and to Rui Gomes and John Roosa for their 
comments. This is a shortened version of TAPOL 's analysis. 
The full version is available on request, published as TAPOL 
Occasional Reports No. 26, £ 1.00 incl. postage. • 
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Are the forces of occupation losing control? 
In a su~den. reversal of strat~gy, the forces of occupation in East Timor have lashed out against the 
pop~latwn 1~ the re~o~e reg~o~ of Alas while more troops flood in amid reports of new military op-
eratwns against Falmt1l. This 1s m response to the many public meetings held in the occupied coun-
try, calling for a referendum and the release of Xanana Gusmao. 
Already in June, students from the University of East 
Timor and from a number of academies, meeting under the 
umbrella of the Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa Lorosae 
(East Timor Students' Solidarity Council), decided to initi-
ate discussions on the question of East Timor' s future. Ac-
cording to the Council's leader Antero Bendito da Silva, 
during a brief visit to London, the aim was to build an 
awareness among the East Timorese of their existence as a 
nation and to strengthen people 's knowledge about the 
principles of democracy and differences of opinion. 
Teams were dispatched to many parts of the country 
where meetings were held to discuss these issues and East 
Timor' s right to a referendum. In many places the meetings 
were held without too much interference, but elsewhere, 
the military stepped in, blocking students on their journeys 
or preventing meetings from taking place. 
Jakarta offers autonomy 
In June, Indonesia' s president announced that 'special 
status' was on offer and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas started 
talking about 'wide-ranging autonomy' for East Timor. 
A !though the proposal is now under discussion at the UN 
talks between Indonesia and Portugal, it has aroused wide-
spread opposition in East Timor where it is seen as a move 
by Jakarta to maintain control over the territory. The Indo-
nesians also allege that a referendum would only provoke 
conflict and even civil war because the East Timorese are 
so divided on the issue. 
Recognising the need to bring together all sides in the 
argument over autonomy or referendum, the two Catholic 
bishops, Carlos Filipe Belo. in Dili and Basilio Nascimento 
in Baucau convened a two-day dialogue in Dare on · 10-11 
September attended by many parties and groups. An 11-
point statement was adopted, acknowledging the right to 
differences of opinion and the need for 'further efforts to 
realise a common platform to unite the people of Lorosae, 
leading to the establishment of a representative forum for 
all East Timorese'. [Jakarta Post, 14 September] 
Meanwhile, more than seven hundred East Timorese 
graduates from universities in Indonesia and overseas have 
set up a Graduates' Forum for a Referendum and the De-
velopment of East Timor called Forsarepetil. In its very 
first communique it called for the release of Xanana and all 
East Timorese political prisoners, an end to all forms of 
violence and the disarming of Indonesia's para-military 
units. 
Soon afterwards, fourteen political prisoners being held 
in Becora Prison, Dili, began a hunger strike calling for the 
release of all East Timorese political prisoners, especially 
Xanana Gusmao. As the strike wore on and some of the 
strikers were being given intravenous feeding, others 
joined in, bringing the number to 35 . Fearing for the lives 
of the prisoners, Xanana Gusmao called on the men to 
abandon their action, saying he did not want yet more sac-
rifices when so many lives had already been lost. 
Calls for the governor to resign 
Fearful of the mounting support for a referendum 
among government employees, Governor Abilio Orosio 
Soares announced on 6 October that all government em-
ployees who did not support East Tim or's integration into 
Indonesia should 'voluntarily' resign or else face the sack. 
This provoked an immediate response from the newly-
established Forsarepetil, most of whose members are gov-
ernment employees. They condemned it as being in breach 
of the spirit of reformasi and the reconciliation agreement 
so painstakingly drafted at the September Dare meeting. . 
On 10 October, a huge protest strike brought public 
transport and commerce in Dili to a virtual standstill . On 
the following day, Sunday, thirty thousand people rallied 
on the streets of Dili condemning the governor and calling 
for his resignation. People arrived in the capital on scores 
of trucks ~nd motorbikes to join in the protest. An attempt 
to gather m the forecourt of the Governor's residence was 
prevented by anti-riot police so the crowds marched round 
the city and ended the rally with a free-speech forum in a 
square near the residence. Even larger numbers rallied in 
Dili two days later as thousands converged on the city from 
Liquica and Ermera. [Suara Timar Timur, and Report by 
the Peace and Justice Commission, Dili, 12 October] 
The next day, thousands of Timorese returning to Se-
cora were confronted by 600 riot police bristling with 
semi-automatic and automatic rifles, blocking their way 
home. The danger of open confrontation which could have 
led to bloodshed was averted by the intervention of repre-
sentatives of the Dili office of the CNRT, the National 
Council for Timorese Resistance, who stood between the 
security forces ~nd the demonstrators and negotiated a way 
out of the conflict. [Canberra Times, 19 October] 
Renewed military operations 
While these public manifestations of support for a ref-
er~ndum were u?derway in many parts of the territory, 
thmgs were defimtely far from quiet on the military front. 
Claims that the army was in the process of cutting back 
the number of troops in the territory were hotly disputed by 
local reports of thousands of troops arriving. On 12 Octo-
ber, ten thpusand people from the sub-districts of Baguia, 
Laga, Quelicai, Venilale and Vemasse rallied in Baucau to 
protest against the arrival of more troops in the area as wit-




nessed by the populace. [See also separate article analysing 
leaked military documents.] 
For months, the military commander of Korem 
164/Wira Dharma, Colonel Tono Suratman, had been 
claiming that the army was no longer engaged in opera-
tions against the armed guerrillas in Fa/inti/. He even sug-
gesting that guerrillas were welcome to take part in meet-
ings provided that they first reported to the local authori-
ties. However, behind this facade of camaraderie, a very 
different situation was developing. 
On 3 October, the deputy-commander of Falintil , Taur 
Matan Ruak sent a message to the outside world saying 
that he and his company of guerrillas had been encircled by 
two battalions dispatched from Baucau, numbering around 
two thousand troops. The guerrillas managed to escape due 
to their superior knowledge of the terrain but small de-
tachments were still trying to discover the guerrillas' 
whereabouts. 
The military commander later hinted that the army's 
strategy was about to change when he told Andrew Perrin, 
a journalist from Australia that ' there is a limit to the new 
era of openness ... , a limit to our tolerance'. At the same 
time, a guerrilla leader in the Los Palos region was quoted 
as saying that military operations were taking place in his 
region which might lead to the guerrillas being forced to 
retaliate, to secure their position. [Canberra Times, 24-25 
October] 
At the time, the armed wing of the resistance showed no 
signs of engaging in military operations. When Richard 
Lloyd Parry of The Independent went into the bush to meet 
Lere Anak Timor, the second man in Fa/inti!, in late Oc-
tober, he was told in no uncertain terms: 'The only solution 
is a peaceful solution based on international law and based 
on the support of the international community and the 
United Nations.' [The Independent, 4 November) 
But a relentless build-up of Indonesian troops was un-
derway, presaging new military operations which might 
force the guerrillas to respond. According to a report from 
the Third Military Zone of Fa/inti! on 27 October, the In-
donesian army was bringing in reinforcements for a sur-
prise attack on all guerrilla positions in Nove~ber. ~he 
reinforcements included more Brimob (the ehte po!tce 
corps) units and more East Timorese soldiers for incorpo-
ration into Battalions 744 and 745 which are permanently 
based in East Tim or. The report also monitored the arrival 
in Kupang, West Timor of more combat troops, including 
air-borne army units, marines and Kostrad troops, for im-
mediate dispatch to East Timor. 
This reversal in the army's strategy was triggered not 
by the threat of an offensive by Fa/inti! but by the recogni-
tion that the forces of occupation had lost the battle for the 
hearts and minds of the population. They thought that 
greater openness would make the Timorese more kindly 
disposed towards their oppressors, but the contrary was 
happening: the openness was giving people the opportunity 
to voice their true feelings and organise themselves for an 
independent future. 
Killings and terror in Alas 
As the storm clouds gathered, it was in the sub-district 
of Alas, about 175 kms due south of Dili, that the army 
launched a campaign of terror against the civilian popula-
tion in November. 
Alas sub-district in the district of Manufahi is not easily 
accessible by road especially during th~ ra~ny seas?n be-
cause of thick forest and poor communications. First re-
ports that something was amiss came when . a smal_I de-
tachment of Indonesian soldiers was attacked m the village 
of Weberek which is the site of a transmigration site for 
Indonesian farmers. The army claimed the men had gone 
out on patrol unarmed and were later found dead from stab 
wounds. It appears that the patrol infiltrated a publi.c 
meeting of Timorese discussing their own problems. Their 
presence aroused suspicion an~ ~hey .were ho~nded out. 
According to Major Wisnumurt1, mtellig~nce chief of staff 
of the Dili military command, the soldiers had been set 
upon by about three hundred local people. [Jawa Pas, I 
November] Intentionally or not, their presence had acted as 
a provocation. · 
The killings prompted the security forces to initiate a 
campaign of terror to hunt down the perpetrators and ter-
rorise the population. Hundreds of extra troops were sent to 
Alas and young people were warned that they were at risk 
of arrest. As tensions mounted, there was an attack on the 
Alas Koramil (military command) on 9 November. Three 
soldiers were killed, thirteen soldiers were taken captive 
and 36 firearms and ammunition were seized. Eleven of the 
captives were released immediately while two East 
Timorese are reportedly being held by a local Fa/inti! unit. 
It was suggested at the time that Fa/inti! was responsible 
for the Koramil attack, but other sources say that villagers 
from Taitudah were the ones who carried out the attack in 
response to the terror. 
More Battalion 744 and 745 troops descended on the 
region in retaliation for the attack. While many young peo-
ple fled, women, children and elderly people took refuge in 
a local church. 
On 20 November, high-level bilateral talks at the UN in 
New York were suspended by the Portuguese government. 
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan expressed concern 
about reports coming from East Timor and called for re-
straint on all sides. 
Meanwhile, reports were emerging of summary kill-
ings. The village chief of Taitudah, Vicente de Andrade, 
was shot dead, two of his nieces were arrested and a group 
of youths seized by the army disappeared without trace. 
The names of eleven people killed during the crackdown 
were confirmed by the Peace and Justice Commission in 
Dili while former governor of East Timor, Mario Carras-
calao, told the press in Jakarta that he had been informed 
that 44 people had been killed in Alas. 
Since the whole area had been sealed off, on-the-spot 
verification of the killings proved impossible. Human 
rights activists were prevented from entering the area. 
Water supplies and electricity had been cut and food was 
scarce, prompting Bishop Belo to demand that relief teams 
be allowed to enter. He also urged the military commander 
to withdraw his troops from Alas. 
Students occupy parliament building 
On 23 November, four thousand students from the 
Students Solidarity Council occupied the building of the 
provincial assembly, the DPRD, to demand the cessation of 
military operations in Manufahi. They also said that 
continued on page 17 
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Independence calls reverberate in West Papua 
Another flag-raising, more arrests and trials. The political atmosphere in West Papua, known to In-
donesia as its province of Irian Jaya, has been transformed since the downfall of Suharto in May 
this year. Calls for independence or dialogue on the status of the territory continue to reverberate 
de!tpite the murderous attack on people who raised the West Papuan flag in Biak in July and the 
army's threat to treat all actions in support of independence as treachery. 
The flag-raising incident in Biak to mark the anniver-
sary of the declaration of West Papuan independence on 1 
July 1971 (check date) led to many deaths and disappear-
ances . Unfurling kejora, the Morning Star flag, has been a 
traditional act of defiance for many years but it has oc-
curred with greater frequency in the past few months . 
West Papua was surrendered to Indonesia following a 
UN-endorsed treaty between the Netherlands and Indone-
sia in 1962. The 1969 ' act of free choice' gave West Papua 
no choice but to integrate with Indonesia. Resistance to 
Indonesian rule was more muted under Suharto. While re-
formasi in Indonesia means democratisation, in West 
Papua it means independence for many people . 
Carrot and stick 
The armed forces, ABRI, have faced a barrage of criti-
cism for the atrocities committed during the Suharto re-
gime, especially in West Papua, Aceh and East Timor 
which are all known as daerah rawan or 'areas of unrest'. 
In an attempt to clean up their disreputable image, ABRI 
announced a 'gradual' reduction in the number of troops in 
West Papua and an end to the territory ' s status as a daerah 
operasi militer, 'military operations zone ' or DOM. But 
there is no way of monitoring the troop reductions. (It is 
well established that in East Timar it has meant quite the 
opposite, see separate item.) As for DOM, all that has hap-
pened is that it has been replaced by a new classification, 
pengawalan daerah rawan or 'supervised region of un-
rest'. 
The ABRI regional commander, Major-General Amir 
Sembiring, also took everyone by surprise with an an-
nouncement at the end of September that the army had 
agreed to a ceasefire with the Organisasi Papua Merdeka 
(OPM). ABRI have never before entered into negotiations 
with the armed wing of the independence movement in 
West Papua. The ceasefire was reached following talks 
between the army and representatives of OPM commander 
Mathias Wenda who commands the north-eastern sector of 
the country. Wenda's objectives in agreeing a ceasefire 
have not been divulged, nor is it clear whether Wenda rep-
resents .the other sectors of the OPM in this far-flung terri-
tory. 
The Indonesian parliament also been part of this softly-
softly approach by dispatching a 'fact-finding team'. to 
Jayapura, talking to local leaders and NGOs and promoting 
the idea of peaceful dialogue on the territory's status. 
Four on trial in Biak 
Meanwhile, four men went on trial in Biak on 5 Octo-
ber for their part in the July flag-raising, six were arrested 
in Jayapura for conspiring to conduct a meeting to discuss 
West Papua's status, and at least ten were arrested for 
raising the kejora in Manokwari, on the north coast. 
The men on trial at the district court in Biak-Numfor 
are: Philipe Karma (40 years), Nelles Sroyer, Agustinus 
Sada and Clemens Rumsarwir. They are among the 
scores of people taken into custody after army units opened 
fire on hundreds of people in the vicinity of the flag-pole in 
Biak harbour on 6 July . The flag had been kept aloft for 
five days . An unknown number of people were killed dur-
ing the attack and many people are still unaccounted for. 
Philipe Karma was serious wounded in the leg but his 
would was left to fester unattended during his first days in 
custody. 
The men have been charged under Article 106 of the 
Criminal Code with rebellion or secession for which the 
maximum penalty is life. They are being defended by a 
team of lawyers from Jayapura and Jakarta. Their attitude 
in court was one of defiance; when asked their citizenship, 
they all replied: ' West Papuan!' The broach pinned to 
Karma's tie was decorated with the West Papuan flag. 
Hundreds of people came to the courtroom to express 
their sympathy with the accused men. The area surround-
ing the courthouse was heavily guarded by security forces. 
The trial is likely to continue for several months. 
Altogether 32 lawyers from Jayapura and Jakarta have 
agreed to be part of a Team for Human Rights Protection in 
lrian Jaya to handle the cases of 20 people being held as 
suspects. Team member Albert Rumbekwan told the press 
in Jakarta of their determination to undertake this mission 
even though they had b.een terrorise·d by unidentified men 
for doing so. [Jakarta Post, 15 September] 
Eight arrested in Jayapura 
In early October, the security forces arrested eight peo-
ple in Jayapura for their involvement in planning a two-day 
meeting that was to have discussed the status of West 
Papua. The initiative had been taken under the umbrella of 
a newly-formed Committee for the Independence of West 
Papua and was scheduled to take place at the Arts and 
Culture Centre in the city on 1-2 October. Many people 
had been invited to participate, including members of the 
local assembly and people from the governor's office. 
T APOL Bulletin No. 149/150, December 1998 27 
WEST PAPUA 
The first to be arrested was Drs Don Flassy, secretary 
of the Regional Planning and Development Board, 
Bappeda, followed by a Protestant clergyman, the Rev. 
Agustinus Ansanai, and two more government officials, 
Barnabas Yufuwai and Laurens Mehuwe. A fifth person 
was Sem Yaru, a former political prisoner who appears to 
have handed himself in after being intimidated by the secu-
rity forces . Two students were also arrested but they were 
released after being held for questioning for a couple of 
days. 
But the arrest which stunned local opinion most of all 
occurred on 6 October, when Theys Eluay, the revered 
traditional leader of the Santani tribe, the ondofolo, was 
taken from his home at crack of dawn by a unit of the spe-
cial police force, Brimob. The tribal chief had made it 
known that, in his position as leader of the people, he felt 
duty bound to stand up for his people who had been ar-
rested since the flag-raising incidents at the beginning of 
July. In saying that he 'took responsibility' for everything 
they had done, this was interpreted by the authorities as 
meaning that he had been in charge of everything. 
Theys Uluay has made no secret of his support for in-
dependence for West Papua. Back in 1969, he was a mem-
ber of the council of over one thousand tribal chieftains 
who had been hand-picked by the Indonesian military 
authorities to vote on the 'act of free choice' which sealed 
West Papua's fate as part of Indonesia. He has long since 
abandoned support for integration with Indonesia. 
At the time of his arrest, members of his tribe had been 
preparing to bind him physically, according to custom, and 
hand him over to the authorities. His intention was that, in 
taking responsibility for all that had happen, he would offer 
himself as a prisoner in exchange for the release of all the 
others. Much to the chagrin of the tribal elders, the security 
forces refused to allow this to happen. According to his 
lawyers who were allowed to be present at his interroga-
tion, Theys Uluay challenged his interrogators throughout 
the session. 
All the six men still in custody are likely to be charged 
under Article 110 of the Criminal Code, for conspiracy to 
engage in a rebellion, for which the maximum sentence is 
life imprisonment. 
The sole aim of the Committee for the Independence of 
West Papua was to enter into dialogue. This was in line 
with the proposal of the parliamentarians who had visited 
Jayapura in August. One of the lawyers working on the 
case, Abdul Rachman Uapara, intends to consult experts in 
political science on whether plans to hold dialogue about 
independence without any resort to violence can be classi-
fied as an act of rebellion. As one of the detainees has said, 
' these will be cases in which thoughts are put on trial'. 
Should these cases reach the courts, as seems likely, the 
trials will become the focus of popular support for the ideas 
advocated by these men, causing yet more 'security prob-
lems' for the army and the police. 
[Sources: Cendrawasih Pos, 3, 7 and 9 October, and 
reports received via the Internet from IHRST AD, the In-
stitute for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy.] 
Flag-raising in Manokwari 
Undeterred by the harsh handling of flag-raisers in Biak 
and Sorong in July, a group of people went ahead with a 
similar action in Manokwari, a town on the north coast of 
West Papua. 
Early in the morning of 2 October, a group of people 
approached the flag-pole in the forecourt of local assembly, 
paid their respects to the Indonesian flag, pulled it down 
and unfurled the kejora in its place. Aft.er making speeches 
to the crowd that had gathered, they asked to meet the dis-
trict chief for a dialogue but he refused, saying he was no 
authorised to discuss independence with anyone. Within 
minutes, a police unit headed by the local police chief ar-
rived on the scene and set up barricades around the area. 
The people watching quickly grew in number. Soon after 
prayers were said, some policemen tried to pull the flag 
down but were held back by the flag-raisers. In the scuffle 
that followed, the flag fell to the ground. The police 
opened fire, shooting rubber bullets into the air; according 
to some witnesses, they also directed their fire into the 
crowd. Some people in the crowd responded by throwing 
stones and one policeman was hit on the head. 
Incensed by the police actions, some people left the 
scene and went along the main streets where they set about 
attacking shops and buildings. Government buildings were 
a prime target as well as the homes of non-Papuan resi-
dents. The amount of damage was later estimated at over 
Rp 1,500 million. An investigation team from several 
churches sent to Manokwari later was unable to verify how 
these attacks on property began and whether they had been 
instigated by organised groups. 
It was several days before commercial life got back to 
normal. 
. ~en people .have since been arrested and held for ques-
ttonmg. They mclude four college students, four primary 
school teachers and two government employees. If 
charged, they too are likely to be accused of rebellion. 
Independence the only way 
A report published by PGI, the Indonesian Communion 
of Churches, which includes all Protestant churches in In-
donesia, concluded that the people of Irian Jaya were now 
calJing for ind~pendence as the only way. The report was 
wntten following a pastoral visit by religious leaders to 
West Papua. The report said that 'military atrocities and the 
unfairness wi.th which the go~ernment treated the province 
h~d r:sulted l? the people losmg patience'. Rev. Karel Er-
an said t~e, I~1anese had suffered too much at the hands of 
an a~thontanan govern~ent, a repressive military and an 
unfair development pohcy. 'Their aspirations have been 
heard and ignored. Now their only demand is independ-
ence,' he said. [Jakarta Post, 15 September] * 
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Forcibly deported refugee goes on trial 
An Acehnese who was forcibly repatriated back to Aceh from Malaysia has gone on trial on charges 
connected with his activities in support of the Free Aceh Movement. His prosecution gives the lie to 
the Malaysian government's assertions that he and other Acehnese who have sought asylum in Ma-
laysia should not be regarded as political refugees. 
Ishak Daud, 36, went on trial iri Lhokseumawe district 
court at the end of August. He was forcibly repatriated 
from Malaysia in March this year despite the fact that he 
had been granted permanent residence. His repatriation 
was in flagrant violation of the UN Convention on Refu-
gees. The government of Mahathir Muhamad has refused 
to acknowledge that any of the Acehnese who fled from 
their country in the past decade are refugees entitled to po-
litical asylum. 
Daud was a member of the Acehnese Refugeee Com-
mittee in Malaysia at the time of his abduction. His wife, 
who was pregnant at the time, was kept in the dark about 
his whereabouts for many months. 
According to the indictment, he is charged for conspir-
ing along with others not yet arrested to murder soldiers at 
a military post in the district of Lhokseumawe on 20 May 
1990 and of seizing weapons and ammunition from the 
post. The maximum penalty is death. The indictment 
makes no mention of Daud's political motivation as a 
member of the Free-Aceh Movement but says only that the 
motive for the attack was 'hatred for the armed forces or 
out of a sense of revenge'. 
In a demurrer challenging the indictment, his team of 
lawyers said that the prosecutor had completely failed to 
take account of the defendant's political views which are 
central to the case .. It also questioned the prosecutor's use 
of no fewer than six alternative charges and articles for the 
court to choose from. 
The defence lawyers described how the defendant had 
been kidnapped in Malaysia on 25 March this year, in fla-
grant violation of the human rights Malaysia is reputed to 
uphold, and transported to Indonesia in extraordinary cir-
cumstances (see below). They said the government of Ma-
hathir Muhamad should be held responsible for his kidnap 
and deportation. 
Dragged behind a speedboat 
Ishak was kidnapped by unidentified men in Kuala 
Lumpur on 27 March along with two colleagues, and 
handed over to the Malaysian police, handcuffed and 
hooded, and bundled onto a speedboat manned by mem-
bers of the Indonesian security forces for the trip across the 
strait to Riau. They were nearly drowned on the perilous 
journey during which they were tied to inflated rubber 
tubes, pushed off the boat and dragged from behind as the 
vessel sped its way to Riau. One of the three, Burhan Sja-
maun, 40, has subsequently disappeared and is thought to 
have died as a result of torture. 
Ishak Daud and Syahrul Syamaun who survived the 
horrific ordeal were flown by military helicopter from Riau 
to Banda Aceh. After three weeks they were removed to 
prisons in Lhokseumawe and Langsa. 
Trial a 'time bomb' for local security 
The trial of Ishak Daud has come at a time when Aceh 
is traumatised by daily revelations of the discovery of mass 
graves and of killings, disappearances and torture perpe-
trated by members of the Indonesian armed forces during a 
decade of unmitigated terror. It will not be lost of the tens 
of thousands of victims that while Ishak Daud, a declared 
member of the Free Aceh Movement, is being charged for 
killing two Indonesian soldiers at a military post, not a sin-
gle Indonesian soldier has been taken into custody, let 
alone charged and tried for the thousands of crimes com-
mitted against civilians in Aceh since 1989. A school-boy 
was also killed in the attack; it would be interesting to 
know why he was at the army post - in custody perhaps? 
Initially, Daud refused to recognise the legitimacy of 
the court, declaring that he was not an Indonesian citizen 
and demanding to the defended by a Malaysian lawyer. He 
later agreed to be assisted by a team of Indonesian lawyers, 
arranged through the intermediary of Suaram, a human 
rights organisation based in Penang. 
During the early stages of the trial, security forces en-
tered the prison in Lhokseumawe where he was being held 
and opened fire on the inmates. Daud was wounded in the 
arm and from then has lived in fear for his safety. 
By the time it entered its fourth session, the trial was 
being described in the local press as a 'time bomb', threat-
ening to cause major security problems. The crowds who 
gathered for each hearing grew in number, with thousands 
unable to gain entry to the courtroom. The crowds ex-
pressed sympathy for the defendant and contempt for the 
court and its proceeding~. 
Serambi Indonesia [ 19 September] reported that local 
officials were afraid the trial might lead to disruptions in 
Lhokseumawe, a key industrial centre, where riots erupted 
a week before the trial commenced. They took the unusual 
step of making a request to the judicial authorities for the 
trial to be transferred to Sabang, 437 kms north of Lhokse-
umawe. (Trials are supposed to be held in the district 
where the crime was committed.) There was also concern 
that Daud did not deport himself with the deference ex-
pected of a man facing serious charges. He was behaving 
'like a film star', said one observer, using the courtroom as 
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a · free-speech forum' to expound on his views about the 
conflict in Aceh. 
Although the presiding judge regarded Daud 's rebuttal 
of the prosecution charges as being ·irrelevant', he did not 
dare stop him for fear of causing uproar in court. His re-
buttal was said to be full of 'separatist propaganda', capa-
ble of arousing the passions of his supporters inside and 
outside the court. 
The local authorities also alleged that Daud had 
·contaminated· his fellow prisoners with his political ideas. 
[Serambi Indonesia. 19 September] 
Defendant goes on the attack 
After the prisoner was transferred to Sabang Prison, he 
was placed under heavy guard. [Serambi Indonesia, 8 Oc-
tober] 
Following the transfer of the trial to Sabang, the hear-
ings appear to have been dragged out even though it was 
said initially that 'marathon' sessions would be held to 
complete the trial within a couple of weeks. 
In a statement to the court on 27 October, the defendant 
rebuked the local press for misrepresenting his case and 
even alleging that he and his movement, the Free Aceh 
Movement had instigating the riots that erupted in the city 
of Lhokseumawe on 31 August this year. The riots had 
been provoked in order to give the army justification for 
maintaining its troops in Aceh, he said. Such lies were a 
danger to him as the defendant and to his movement striv-
ing to liberate Aceh from the Javanese yoke. He also 
strongly objected to the press referring to his movement as 
Gerombolan Pengacau Liar or 'wild disrupter gang'. 
'Since we proclaimed an Independent Aceh on 4 De-
cember 1976, tens of thousands of Acehnese have been 
killed, thousands of women have been raped and thousands 
of children have lost their parents while the wealth of the 
region had been plundered by the colonisers. Scores of 
Acehnese are languishing in prisons in Banda Aceh, Bi-
reuen, Lhokseumawe, Lhoksukon, Langsa and Medan.' 
He sa id that the fact-finding team that recently visited 
North Aceh had concluded that 93 per cent of the killings 
and disappearances during the military operations era had 
been perpetrated by the Indonesian army, another 2.7 pe-
cent by their lackeys while the Free Aceh Movement were 
responsible for only 4.3 per cent with the killing of mem-
bers of the armed forces. Yet, not a single member of the 
army had been charged court for their crimes. 
Unfair procedures in court 
Ishak Daud also complained that defence witnesses had 
been prevented from testifying in his trial on a variety of 
pretexts. A co-prisoner named Syahrul Syamaun, who was 
deported together with him from Malaysia and is now be-
ing held in Langsa Prison, had written to tell him that the 
authorities would not permit him, Ishak Daud, to appear as 
a witness in his trial. These and other injustices made a 
mockery of the principle of a fair trial, he said, and should 
be exposed before the international community. 
He complained that he was being denied facilities to 
care for his health and was even being refused medicines 
unless he paid for them himself. 
During a court hearing on 5 November, the defendant 
defiantly refused to collaborate with the court because he 
insisted that a police officer be summoned to testify. The 
conflict remained unresolved until the judge finally ordered 
the defendant to leave the court. 
At the following hearing, the prosecutor Summed up his 
case against Daud and asked the court to sentence him to 
life imprisonment. The session was again disrupted by the 
defendant who again insisted on not collaborating with the 
proceedings unless the police officer was called. 
The defence lawyers also complained that the decision 
to shift the trial hearings to Sabang had made their work 
much more difficult. 
The verdict in the case will be reported in our next is-
we. * 
Conflict with ABRI intensifies 
In November several incidents occurred in North Aceh 
between ABRI and the local population. The nature of the 
incidents points to a similarity with recent incidents in East 
Tim or [see separate article]. A diplomat told The Age [ 19 
November]: 'The view is that Aceh is exactly the same as 
East Timor - there was a staged withdrawal of special 
forces and then they were sent in again through the back 
door.' 
The downfall of Suharto has been used effectively by 
the pop11lation of Aceh. Taking advantage of the openness 
and political transparency, there has been an upsurge of 
social and political activities which would have been un-
thinkable in the Suharto era. The armed forces have been 
the main target for they were the cause of all the sufferings 
and misery in Aceh. 
These actions forced ABRI to promise to end DOM, the 
special military status [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 148] and 
with it the withdrawal of all troops that had been brought in 
from outside including special units and non-organic units 
from elsewhere. 
Lhokseumawe explodes on 2 November 
An unprecedented show of force occurred early in the 
morning of 2 November in Lhokseumawe. A convoy of 
about .100 motorcycles, 35 minibuses and many trucks 
drove mto town. Many of the people in the convoy were 
heavily armed. They first went to the grave of an Acehnese 
hero named Malikul Saleh near Kota Geudong and then 
continued their journey to Lhokseumawe. 
They were flying Free Aceh (GAM) flags and shouting 
slogans in support of Aceh Merdeka. Red-and-white Indo-
nesian flags flying on official buildings were torn down. 
The action ended after midday at Desa Kandang, a village 
regarded . by the security fo~ces as a GAM stronghold. 
Kandang 1s very close to the 011 and gas capital of Aceh 
continued on page J 7 
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Arms sales intensify debt crisis 
~APOL has repeated its call for a complete ban on arms sales following the revelation that Indone-
sia has been forced to reschedule part of its public sector debt relating to military contracts. 
The poverty-stricken Indonesian people will still have 
to pay for military equipment which has no conceivable 
connection with efforts to rescue them from their desperate 
eco.nomic plight, despite the rescheduling agreement, 
which allows only for a three-year moratorium on the re-
payment of principal. 
The re.scheduled debt is thought to include the amount 
owed for 16 Hawk aircraft worth £300 million, licensed for 
export in November 1996 and due for delivery in 1999. 
The United Nations estimates that two-thirds of Indone-
sians will be living in poverty by next year and debt serv-
icing is bound to impact primarily on the poor. In October, 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, pointed out that it would be 
the height of irresponsibility for Indonesia to continue with 
its arms purchases given the state of the economy. The only 
exception would be for the Hawk aircraft, he said [Inter 
Press Service, 19 October]. 
TAPOL has written to Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, 
urging him to cancel the delivery of the Hawks. The Gov-
ernment previously said that it would not be 'realistic or 
practical' to revoke existing licences, but whatever the 
contractual obligations to the manufacturers, there is a 
higher moral imperative for the Government to take action 
to reduce the debt burden which adds to the suffering of so 
many people. 
There is still uncertainty surrounding the nature of the 
Hawks licence. Export licences normally last for two years, 
.but for some unexplained reason, this licence is a 'contract' 
licence valid for four years. Enquiries are being made as to 
the meaning of this. 
Favouring the defence industry 
Meanwhile, it is unlikely that proposals for new legisla'-' 
tion on export controls and changes in licensing proce-
dures, contained in a Department of Trade and Industry 
White Paper, will result in fewer licences being granted. 
The Government has failed to respond to the urgent 
need for greater transparency and accountability identified 
by the Scott Report on exports to Iraq. In particular it rules 
out parliamentary and public scrutiny of individual licens-
ing applications and will not allow a right of appeal against 
a decision to grant a licence~ 
The publication of a retrospective annual report on arms 
exports (the first of which has been due for some time) 
does not address the need to ensure that licences are not 
granted for equipment which might contribute to the abuse 
of human.rights and other abuses. 
EssentiaJly the changes proposed by the White Paper 
amount to little more than window-dressing and fail to 
challenge the overweening influence of the defence indus-
try over government policy and decision-making. [A copy 
of TAPOL's response to the White Paper is available on 
request.] 
A letter from the Defence Secretary, George Robertson, 
to Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, published in the Inde-
pendent on Sunday on 26 July, revealed the extraordinary 
lengths to which the defence industry and ministry officials 
will go to undermine the Government's so-called ethical 
foreign policy. One of six licences refused by the Gov-
ernment since it came to power was for the export of 
Courtaulds Aerospace armoured Land Rovers to the dis-
graced General Prabowo and his Kopassus special forces. 
Secretary Robertson was persuaded to write of a man re-
sponsible for the abduction and torture of activists in Indo-
nesia and numerous killings in East Timor: 'The General is 
recognised as an enlightened officer, keen to increase pro-
fessionalism within the armed forces and to educate them 
in areas such as human rights.' 
At the time the licence was blocked by Robin Cook, in 
September 1997, it was reported that the Prime Minister's 
office reacted angrily to Mr Cook's decision and urged him 
to moderate his policy. He did not need much persuading 
as he has since approved almost all licence applications. 
Accordi~g to the latest available figures up to 1 O May 
67 export licences had been granted for Indonesia under 
Labour and only the six had been refused. 
Other developments: Alvis and GKN 
Two well-known names in the Anglo-Indonesian arms 
trade, Alvis and GKN, have recently merged their ar-
moured vehicles manufacturing businesses. The compa-
nies' vehicles and water cannon are familiar sights on the 
streets of Jakarta and other cities at times of popular pro-
test. Most recently, they were part of the armoury used to 
attack unarmed students on Black Friday [see separate 
item]. 
Alvis had earlier indicated that they will not be export-
ing any more tanks to Indonesia after September as they 
expect no more licences. However, reports indicate that 
they still have a large number of Indonesian orders on their 
books. 
The Peace Camp outside the Alvis factory in Coventry 
has now closed down, but the group's presence will con-
tinue to be felt at a new Peace House in the city. 
Hull University 
On a positive note, no Indonesian army officers have 
been admitted to Hull University this academic year. The 
University clainis that this is due solely to the situation in 
Indonesia, ~ut there is no doubt that the campaign against 
the Indonesian officers proved hugely embarrassing for the 
University authorities and may have played a part. * 
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Yunus Yosfiah's role in the Balibo killings 
A film shown on Australian television has thrown the spotlight on the role of Yunus Yosfiah, who is 
now Indonesia's Minister of Information, in the killing of jive television journalists in Balibo, East 
Timor 011 16 October 19 75. The British government has also taken the first tentative steps towards 
seeking an inquiry into the murders. 
The appointment of Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Yunus 
Yosfiah as Minister of Information in the government of 
President Habibie could draw greater attention in Indonesia 
to the killing on 16 October 1976 of five television jour-
nalists as they were trying to cover the early stages of In-
donesia· s invasion of East Timor. 
On 20 October this year, the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation broadcast a film which identified Yosfiah as 
the officer who led the troops who killed the men and su-
pervised their murders . The documentary included testi-
mony from a crucially important new witness and other 
witnesses who were interviewed by Tom Sherman who 
undertook an investigation for the Australian government 
two years but who were unwilling to tell him all they knew 
because they had no confidence in him. 
From the editors 
Developments in Indonesia since the downfall of Suharto 
have occurred with breathtaking rapidity. We have tried to 
portray the changing face of the country now ruled by a tran-
sitional government headed by an enfeebled president and a 
discredited army. While students take to the streets in Jakarta 
and other cities pressing for an end to the army' s dwifungsi 
and the trial of Suharto, dark forces within the army and loyal 
to the former dictator are taking every opportunity to destabi-
lise society in the hope of undermining the creation of a 
democratic Indonesia. The six months between now next 
year's elections are likely to remain volatile and unstable as 
the forces for democracy seek to foil the disruptive forces. 
In East Timor, West Papua and Aceh, the armed forces are 
bent on using their might to destroy movements pressing for 
independence. Their determination to retain a strongly cen-
tralised state can only reinforce feelings of resentment among 
people in the outer regions who see their resources being 
plundered to finance projects in Java and repay the country's 
crippling foreign debt. 
There is little prospect of the grave economic crisis being 
resolved as long as Indonesia's future continues to be uncer-
tain and the country continues to be ruled by a government 
lacking legitimacy. The IMF continues to dictate the terms of 
the country' s recovery which can only exacerbate the impov-
erishment of tens of millions of Indonesians. 
The political challenges are formidable while human rights 
abuses continue unabated especially in East Timor and West 
Papua. 
We in T APOL are doing our best to cover the events 
which have borne down heavily on our limited resources. We 
apologise for the unfortunate delay in producing the present 
Bulletin which we decided to publish as a double issue in or-
der to catch up. 
We wish all our readers a Happy New Year with a pledge 
to do our best to keep the Bulletin rolling on time during the 
coming critical year for the people of East Timor, West 
Papua, Aceh and Indonesia. * 
The new witness is Olandino Guterres who told jour-
nalist Jill Jolliffe during a recent visit to East Timor that he 
was present when Y osfiah, then in command of a Kopas-
sandha (now called Kopassus) unit, ordered his men to 
shoot the journalists. Four were shot dead and the fifth was 
knifed . Guterres who was a 15-year old UDT fighter with 
the Indonesians at the time, has since left East Timor. 
Y osfiah strongly denied the report though he did not 
deny that he was in Balibo at the time of the murders. He 
had refused to collaborate in the making of the documen-
tary. 
Shortly before the film was shown, British Minister of 
State Derek Fatchett met President Habibie and sought an 
assurance that Indonesia would investigate the Balibo kill-
ings. He was assured by Habibie that he would 'look into 
it'. [The Independent, 19 October]. However, the new ac-
cusations against Y osfiah led to a categorical refusal by the 
Indonesian armed forces to countenance any investigation 
into the matter. * 
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